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ABSTRACT 
In recent years, radical revisionist histories of the 
origins of the Cold War have gained a measure of popularity 
and scholarly acceptance.  Relying on the analytical frame- 
work of economic determinism, these accounts argue that the 
United States, because it pursued aggressive foreign poli- 
cies determined by its economic needs, bears a greater 
share of responsibility for the advent of the Cold War in 
the late 1940's than does the Soviet Union.  Despite their 
apparent relevance in an era when conventional assumptions 
about the conduct of American foreign policy continue to 
be rigorously questioned, radical revisionist accounts of 
the origins of the Cold War are frequently factually inac- 
curate and based on weak reasoning. 
A central contention of radical revisionists such as 
Gabriel Kolko, Lloyd C. Gardner, and William Appleman 
Williams, is that the United States used its preponderant 
military and economic strength to coerce the Soviet Union 
into accepting the American blueprint for reconstruction of 
the post-World War II world—a pax americana which en- 
visioned an open world in which the United States could 
invest and market its surplus goods.  In pressuring the 
Soviet Union, the United States provoked a defensive re- 
action manifested in the consolidation of Russian control 
in Eastern Europe from 1947 on.  This argument does not 
1 
withstand careful examination. 
Most importantly, the examples of American diplomatic 
use of military and economic power most frequently cited by 
revisionist scholars are based on serious distortions of 
fact.  Only by neglecting contradictory evidence and mis- 
representing the evidence they do cite are these scholars 
able to demonstrate the existence of a consistent American 
policy of economic and military diplomacy. 
Moreover, revisionist scholars impute a motivation un- 
derlying ostensible instances of such a policy—the mainten- 
ance of an open world in which to market surplus goods— 
without any directly supporting evidence. 
Finally, the argument that American attempts to put 
pressure on the Soviet provoked it to consolidate control 
in Eastern Europe after 1947 and to maintain an antagon- 
istic stance toward the United States, rests upon the 
assumption that prior to instances of American muscle- 
flexing, Soviet policy—particularly in Eastern Europe— 
was moderate and characterized by tolerance of limited 
pluralism.  This too is incorrect.  Well before many of the 
ostensible instances of American muscle-flexing that rev- 
isionist scholars cite, the Soviet Union demonstrated its 
intention to control Eastern Europe by using whatever 
means were necessary. 
CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION 
The Cold War, the state of tension between the Soviet 
Union and the United States that developed in the immediate 
post-World War II period, lasted until the early 1970's, 
and in many ways continues to exist, has strongly influenced 
the course of recent history.  Conventional understanding 
of the origins of the Cold War saw the state of tension 
arising from Soviet expansionistic tendencies and the felt 
American need to respond to those tendencies in ways that 
would stem them without precipitating the nuclear holocaust 
\ 
that possession of atomic weapons by both nations seemed to 
make likely.  The perceived failure and high cost in re- 
sources, lives, and human suffering occasioned by this con- 
ventional understanding of the Cold War have in recent years 
brought the conventional understanding into sharp question, 
with "revisionist" historians questioning not only the im- 
mediate policies growing out of the conventional under- 
standing, but questioning also the assumptions that could 
produce so dismal a problem as the Vietnam War—ultimately 
offering explanations for events starkly at odds with the 
conventional. 
The nagging suspicion in recent years that American 
involvement in Vietnam was based on faulty assumptions, or 
worse, and was an outgrowth of a deeply flawed political 
and economic structure, has contributed to a greater wil- 
lingness in recent years to accept revisions and reinterpre- 
tations of the origins, nature, and course of American 
foreign policy in the post-World War II period.  The bitter 
fruit born of conventional assumptions has prompted closer 
and more critical attempts to understand and evaluate their 
intellectual integrity.  Although William Appleman Williams1s 
The Tragedy of American Diplomacy was first published in 
1959, revisionist interpretations of the origins of the 
Cold War proliferated and gained popularity in the mid-to- 
late 1960's.  Gar Alperovitz's Atomic Diplomacy appeared in 
1965, while Gabriel Kolko's Politics of War and Lloyd C. 
Gardner's Architects of Illusion were published in 1968 and 
1970 respectively. 
This paper will seek to examine the scholarship of 
"radical" revisionist historians, i.e., those scholars who 
posit an economically determined motivation to American 
foreign policy and place greater blame for the development 
of the Cold War on the United States.  Using the writings 
of Kolko, Williams, and Gardner, particularly, as examples 
of a strain of revisionist thought relying on the analy- 
tical framework of economic determinism, this paper will 
focus on one of the central themes found in these works: 
that the United States attempted to use its military and 
economic strength to achieve its economically determined 
4 
diplomatic ends, and in so doing exacerbated Soviet-American 
tensions, contributing substantially to what is called the 
Cold War.  By making American inflexibility and willingness 
to brandish military and economic strength one of the cen- 
tral causes of the Cold War, revisionist scholars stand 
Cold War history on its head.  In place of a belligerent, 
hostile Soviet Union one finds a moderate, defensive nation 
simply intent upon reconstruction and maintenance of physi- 
cal security.  In place of a moderate defender of freedom 
(the United States), one finds a nation seeking markets for 
surplus production, determined to maintain an open world, 
and willing to exercise the levers of military and economic 
strength to fulfill these ends. 
It is the task of this paper to evaluate this argument. 
CHAPTER 2:  THE OPEN DOOR AND SPHERES OF INFLUENCE 
Revisionist and orthodox historians of the origins of 
the Cold War agree that conflicting foreign policy aims and 
philosophies underlay the growth of tensions between the 
United States and the Soviet Union in the aftermath of 
World War II.  A major theme of that growth of tensions is 
that of the clash between conflicting views of world order. 
Arthur Schlesinger suggests that 
One theme indispensable to an understanding 
of the Cold War is the clash between ... 
the 'universalist' view, by which all nations 
shared a common interest in all the affairs 
of the world, and the 'sphere-of-influence' 
view, by which each great power would be 
assured by the other great powers of an ac- 
knowledged predominance in its own area of 
special interest.1 
In the closing days of World War II, the American universa- 
list view of the world, characterized by a Wilsonian faith 
in collective security, clashed with a clear Soviet desire 
to establish a tier of subordinate or "friendly" states in 
Eastern Europe. This theme, in a variety of forms and in- 
terpretations, runs through the accounts of orthodox, re- 
visionist, and neo-revisionist historians. 
In summarizing the traditional understanding of Ameri- 
can universalism as it affected the American hopes for the 
Yalta conference, Schlesinger quotes Franklin Roosevelt, who 
said upon returning from Yalta that the conference would 
6 
••spell the end of the system of unilateral action, the ex- 
clusive alliances, the spheres of influence, the balances 
of power, and all the other expedients that have been tried 
2 for centuries—and have always failed."  Similar state- 
ments by Cordell Hull emphasized an American desire for an 
end to traditional patterns of diplomacy and the adoption 
3 
of new methods for the assurance of peace and stability. 
Schlesinger notes that Hull's ideas were mirrored in popu- 
lar suspicion of "European power politics" and in the 
thinking of Sumner Welles, Averell Harriman, and Charles 
4 
Bohlen, among others. 
In an "orthodox" understanding, American universalism 
grew out of a genuine concern, on the part of both leaders 
and the public, with establishing a new pattern of inter- 
national relations that would avoid the mistakes of the 
Versailles settlement, a settlement that in Hull's eyes at 
5 
least had sown the seeds of World War II.   That American 
universalism seemed more fervent far from home than in the 
area at least nominally proscribed by the Monroe doctrine 
did not qualify its genuineness. 
By stripping American universalism of its visionary 
internationalist pretensions and investing it with a cras- 
ser materialistic foundation, "hard" revisionists stand 
Cold War history on its head. 
One of the earliest of these historians is William 
Appleman Williams, whose The Tragedy of American Diplomacy, 
7 
first published in 1958, lays the groundwork for the later 
accounts of the origins of the Cold War written by Gabriel 
Kolko, and Lloyd Gardner, who was a student of Williams. 
Instead of focusing on the immediate events of the con- 
clusion of World War II and its aftermath, Williams ex- 
amines American diplomacy en toto as it relates over time 
to unique features of American society and especially to 
economic needs. 
Looking back to American diplomatic history of the 19th 
century, Williams seizes upon the Open Door Notes penned by 
John Hay in 1899, explaining American policy aims in China, 
as the codification of American foreign policy philosophy, 
a policy which Williams suggests, has held from Hay's time 
to the present.  According to Williams, the policy of the 
Open Door was 
designed to clear the way and establish the 
conditions under which America*s preponderant 
economic power would extend the American sys- 
tem throughout the world without the embar- 
rassment and inefficiency of traditional col- 
onialism.^ 
Hay saw no need for territorial expansion if commercial ex- 
pansion were possible through the maintenance of an "open 
door1' to American commerce and navigation in underdeveloped 
areas and in spheres of interest maintained by other powers. 
In advancing this line of thought, Hay fused American ideas 
about relations with the world into a coherent policy. 
Williams quotes an editorial of 1900, written by former 
8 
Secretary of State John W. Foster, who noted: 
Whatever difference of opinion may exist 
among American citizens respecting the pol- 
icy of territorial expansion, all seem to be 
agreed upon the desirability of commercial 
expansion.  In fact it has come to be a 
necessity to find new and enlarged markets 
for our agricultural and manufactured pro- 
ducts. We cannot maintain our present in- 
dustrial prosperity without them.7 
The above excursion into the past is important to an 
understanding of American universalism in relation to the 
Cold War because Williams asserts that American concern 
with Eastern Europe, lay not in a solicitude for democra- 
tic values, but in a desire to maintain an open door for 
American agricultural and manufactured products in much the 
same way as outlined by John W. Foster in 1900.  In the 
internationalism of the Wilson era Williams finds the same 
commercial intentions married to the rhetoric of univer- 
salism.  The Open Door as an American policy in 1900 and 
1945 was in essence colonialism without the mess and fuss 
occasioned by the clumsier efforts of Great Britain, Ger- 
o 
many, and France. This "neocolonialism" grew out of the 
exhaustion of the American frontier and the need for con- 
tinued expansion—a thesis formulated by Frederick Jackson 
Turner—^who linked American prosperity with expansion 
9 
across the American continent.  Williams suggests that 
this exhaustion, coupled with the depression of the 1890,s, 
laid the basis for the policy of the Open Door—a policy 
that bore bitter fruit in the post-World War II era. 
9 
Williams accepts the idea that continued American prosper- 
ity depended on a market for agricultural and industrial 
surpluses and suggests that this idea motivated American 
foreign policy from the turn of the century through the 
1960*s.  To buttress this contention he repeatedly quotes 
American presidents, statesmen, and businessmen to the ef- 
fect that prosperity depended upon continued expansion. 
For Williams then, American universalism in the 20th 
century has been inextricably linked to the perceived need 
for economic expansion in a particular pattern—an expan- 
sionism growing out of the unwillingness of American lead- 
ers to make the domestic changes that would make expansion 
unnecessary and hence an ongoing attempt to "save the ex- 
isting order of business and politics." 
American universalism, as it came into conflict with 
Soviet desires for a European tier of "friendly" states 
represented "only the most recent phase of a more general 
conflict between the established system of Western capital- 
12 ism and its internal and external opponents."   Williams 
focuses on Roosevelt's New Deal trade policies, personi- 
fied in Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, who Williams sug- 
gests posessed "an almost religious faith in the 19th cen- 
tury doctrine of free trade as a solution to the political 
and social, as well as economic, ills of the United States 
13 
and the world."   Describing the foreign policy of the 
Roosevelt administration, Williams emphasizes the concern 
10 
with finding markets for American goods articulated not 
only by Hull, but by numerous other spokesmen within the 
14 administration and in business.   By making the pursuit of 
the open door for commerce the engine of American foreign 
policy for over 50 years, Williams suggests that the tra- 
ditional pursuit of that policy with its universalist pre- 
tensions, was in large part the source of heightened ten- 
sions with the Soviet Union. 
Although Williams purports to eschew the fruitless 
debate over who started the Cold War, suggesting that, 
the real issue is rather the far more subtle 
one of which side committed its power to 
policies which hardened the natural and in- 
herent tensions and propensities into bitter 
antagonisms and inflexible positions,15 
he does indicate that Franklin Roosevelt*s successors, 
having internalized "the theory, the necessity, and the 
16 
morality of open-door expansion,"  undertook "a program 
to force the Soviet Union to accept America*s traditional 
17 
conception of itself and the world."   American rejection 
of spheres of influence as much for economic as for moral 
reasons, coupled with a clear belief in American military 
superiority over the Soviet Union is said to have led to 
American frustration of "conservative" Soviet desires for a 
tier of buffer states in Eastern Europe.  Another result was 
18 American inflexibility in negotiations with the Soviets. 
American unwillingness to discuss territorial arrangements 
11 
with Stalin early in the war stemmed from the fact that 
American leaders, guided by the traditional assumptions of 
the Open Door, "had neither the desire nor the intention 
to negotiate away any equality of opportunity in Eastern 
Europe.*' 
Williams attributes American intransigence in dealings 
with the Soviet Union over Eastern Europe to an ideological 
attachment to the philosophy of the Open Door and to 
America's preponderant postwar military strength.  The self- 
righteous insensitivity to Soviet security needs, coupled 
with a definition of negotiation as "the acceptance of 
American proposals," helped lay the foundations of the Cold 
20 War.    For Williams, the origins of the Cold War lie in 
the inflexibility manifested by American leaders early in 
the war—an inflexibility which reinforced Kremlin hard- 
liners who stressed Western hostility and unwillingness to 
21 
assist in postwar reconstruction. 
In assessing blame for the Cold War to the United 
States, Williams emphasizes the conservative nature of 
Soviet aims in the postwar world.  He notes the stress on 
domestic reconstruction that predominated in both wartime 
and postwar Soviet publications and was expressed in the 
22 desire for Western loans and German reparations.   Williams 
also notes the traditional vulnerability of the Soviet 
Union and pre-revolutionary Russia to attack and the 
12 
insensitivity of American leaders to that feeling of vulner- 
23 
ability.    For Williams, the sources of Soviet conduct are 
"the drives to conquer poverty and achieve basic security in 
24 the world of nation states."   Because of these basic 
drives, Williams suggests that Stalin sought an economic 
and political understanding with the United States and as a 
result restrained revolutionary actions by foreign com- 
munists in hopes of moving slowly enough "to avoid frigh- 
tening the United States into retaliation against the Soviet 
25 Union itself." 
As does Williams, Gabriel Kolko posits a materialistic- 
ally motivated expansiveness as the source of East-West ten- 
sions as well as a broader conflict between revolution and 
"reaction" throughout the world—a conflict in which the 
United States deliberately ranged itself against what Kolko 
calls the "irresistible course toward social transforma- 
26 tion" in the world, or more simply, "the Left."   Kolko 
argues that early in the war American leaders formulated 
postwar economic objectives that because of the "reaction- 
ary" political imperatives attaching to them would in- 
evitably bring the United States into conflict with the 
27 Soviet Union and the Left.   For Kolko, blame for the Cold 
War lies largely with the United States, rather than with 
what he sees as a conservative, defensive Soviet Union: 
Indeed, even if the Soviet Union had not 
existed, the conditions of the Third World 
and America's response toward it after 
13 
1945 would scarcely have been different— 
for Washington's goals predated the war and 
even 1917 itself.28 
Like Williams, Kolko relies on quotations from American 
leaders, among them Cordell Hull and Dean Acheson, to 
demonstrate that American postwar objectives dealt with the 
need to avoid domestic economic crisis by finding markets 
29 for the potential production of the American economy. 
Kolko emphasizes the free trade philosophies of Hull, whom 
he credits with "basic responsibility for American political 
and economic planning for the peace," and whose views were 
30 
unanimously accepted within the Roosevelt administration. 
In Eastern Europe, the American insistence on economic 
access backed up by political actions clashed with the de- 
fense needs of a war-weary Soviet Union, according to this 
view.  Moreover, political development in Eastern Europe, 
as Kolko sees it, unsurprisingly took a leftward and 
31 
nationalistic turn.    Kolko suggests that American economic 
objectives called for the restoration of what he terms 
"conservative" centrist and anti-Soviet parties to power, a 
policy which was intolerable to the invasion-sensitive 
Soviet Union and also to the Eastern European masses, who, 
according to Kolko, strongly favored "long-overdue radical 
32 
social changes."   The United States, he argues, was con- 
cerned with restoring the "semicolonial relationship" of 
Eastern Europe to the rest of the world and preventing 
radical economic changes which "would have impinged on 
14 
American freedom to invest and trade along traditional lines 
33 
so central to its objectives in that area." 
As does Williams, Kolko sees the fundamental political 
divergence between the Soviet Union and the United States 
over Eastern Europe as a result of the clash between in- 
flexible American universalism and the overriding Soviet 
desire for physical security.  Kolko argues that the United 
States failed to distinguish between the essentially con- 
servative postwar aims of the Soviet Union and the radical- 
ism that represented Eastern Europe's response to its form- 
er semicolonial status.  In petulantly responding to Eastern 
Europe's unwillingness to return to its former status, the 
United States provided the unifying and isolating impulse 
34 in the formation of a hostile eastern bloc. 
Kolko's analysis of Soviet aims in the postwar world 
emphasizes, first, the concern with reconstruction and, 
secondarily, the "definite national security interests in 
the region through which the Germans had twice invaded their 
homeland."  Suggesting that "these interests did not in- 
clude revolution," Kolko describes Soviet policy in Eastern 
Europe as pragmatic and pluralistic, noting that political 
rectitude and usefulness in that region were defined by the 
quality of anti-Germanness.  This pragmatism or moderation 
was manifested in Stalin's tolerance of a wide range of 
political and social configurations—a tolerance which van- 
ished when he confronted the potential of a return to prewar 
15 
"reactionary" politics—a phenomenon which the United States 
35 
encouraged for its own economic and ideological reasons. 
American leaders never perceived the essential moderation 
in Soviet policy in Eastern Europe.  Kolko says he knows of 
no evidence American leaders considered these questions: "No 
one formulated a larger interpretation of Eastern European 
events which suggested that the Soviets based their policy 
on pluralistic, nonideological responses always colored by 
local circumstances they did not always control." 
In this paper, the importance of Kolko's analysis lies 
in the specific impact of American capitalism on the growth 
of tension between the Soviet Union and the United States 
over events in postwar Europe.  But for Kolko, these events 
are only part of a much larger pattern.  While his analysis 
bears substantial similarity to Williams's in its general 
outlines, his writings show a sense of identification with 
the movement to the left which he often describes as the 
"hallmark of this century," as well as a critical view of 
American capitalism's expansiveness, which he terms "the 
central theme of postwar history." 
Removed stylistically from the simplistic writings of 
Williams and the polemicizing of Kolko, are the writings of 
Lloyd C. Gardner,  Also a revisionist, he is more sophis- 
ticated in his handling of the clash between American uni- 
versalism and the Soviet desire for a secure sphere of in- 
fluence in Eastern Europe. 
16 
Gardner departs from the interpretations of Kolko and 
Williams by denying literal American concern with Eastern 
European markets.  He suggests that "ffjew American leaders 
seriously believed that East European markets were worth 
all that fuss for any immediate benefit they might have to 
37 American postwar economic problems."   Yet while he re- 
treats from the notion of a specific American concern with 
existing and potential markets in Eastern Europe, Gardner 
does reflect the general outlines of the revisionist ac- 
counts of Kolko and Williams.  Gardner uses the conflict 
between American universalism and the Soviet concern with 
establishing spheres of influence as a starting point. 
Gardner's analysis follows the Kolko-Williams pattern in 
arguing that a preponderantly powerful United States (both 
economically and militarily) had the ability and the desire 
to reconstruct the world in a manner consonant with certain 
deeply held assumptions.  For Gardner, the American posses- 
sion of preponderant power suggests that the United States 
played a more active role in determining the "contours" of 
the ultimate clash between the Soviet Union and the United 
States.38 
Gardner emphasizes the general American concern with 
combating economic nationalism and establishing an integ- 
rated world economy, and once again resurrects Dean 
Acheson's remarks on the dependence of domestic prosperity 
on "constantly expanding trade with other nations and 
17 
39 between other nations."   Gardner imputes a fundamentally 
expansionist thrust to American universalism—emphasizing 
the economic aspects of the universalist ideology and hint- 
ing that the belief that the cause of world peace was ser- 
ved by free economic intercourse among nations was more than 
40 
a little self-serving.   Thus, for Gardner, the American 
goals that clashed with a misunderstood Soviet defensiveness 
were not the outgrowth of a literal desire to penetrate the 
Eastern European market, but of a broader ideological belief 
in internationalism (or collective security) that made ac- 
ceptance of the Russian desire for a Soviet sphere of in- 
fluence in Eastern Europe difficult: 
Economic opportunity in Eastern Europe was 
not essential to American capitalists, but 
an open world was. ... The world could 
not be divided without being closed to some- 
one, so it had better not be divided.^1 
Gardner contrasts American expansiveness with Soviet con- 
servatism, noting Stalin's restraint of Greek communists 
and his overriding concern with "closing the gate that had 
42 been forced twice in the last generation by German armies." 
Ultimately, Gardner lays the blame for the Cold War squarely 
with the United States: 
Responsibility for the way in which the 
Cold War developed, at least, belongs 
more to the United States.  At the end 
of the war it had much greater opportunity 
and far more options to influence the 
course of events than the Soviet Union, 
whose situation in victory was worse in 
some ways than that of the defeated 
countries.43 
18 
The preceding summary of the analyses of three radical 
revisionist historians of the origins of the Cold War sug- 
gests that despite subtle differences of interpretation 
among them, they have articulated similar versions of events 
that depart strikingly from more conventional orthodox or 
neo-revisionist accounts.  The heart of their argument is 
the image of an ideologically inspired, expansionistic 
United States, willing to use its overwhelming military and 
economic power to coerce a prostrate and defensive Soviet 
Union into accepting pax amerlcana and to channel the 
global political events to benefit American economic needs. 
The task of this paper is to assess the validity of 
these analyses and the methodologies underlying them. 
Rather than attempt to comprehensively analyze the 
writings of Kolko, Williams, and Gardner as they describe 
the origins of the Cold War, this paper will focus primarily 
on the events which revisionist scholars frequently cite as 
specific examples of a perceived American intent to use its 
preponderant economic and military strength coercively. 
These are examples cited by the authors as the concrete 
manifestation of policy specifically antagonizing the Soviet 
Union.  Because the issues (and literature) relating to the 
origins of the Cold War are vast and complicated, they defy 
comprehensive coverage.  Since American attempts to use 
economic and military might as a bargaining counter con- 
stitute a central pillar in the argument that the United 
19 
States antagonized a Soviet Union ostensibly willing to 
tolerate limited pluralism in Eastern Europe and concerned 
primarily with its own physical security they provide a 
fruitful framework within which to test the validity of the 
scholarship of major revisionist scholars.  Williams, 
Kolko, and Gardner all suggest that specific attempts at 
using American strength to alter Soviet behavior, especially 
after the successful testing of the atom bomb, antagonized 
the Soviet Union and ultimately provoked the consolidation 
of Soviet control in Eastern Europe.  Kolko, for example, 
indicates that the Soviet Union became "defensive and vigi- 
lant" only in 1947 after the United States had made "a sin- 
cere effort" to secure Eastern Europe "for its framework of 
44 
multilateral trade" by using "many means of pressure." 
Williams similarly suggests that only after the autumn of 
1947 did Stalin, who had only in 1946 become skeptical about 
the possibility of Soviet-American cooperation, "ruthlessly" 
45 
consolidate Soviet control in Eastern Europe.   Williams 
argues elsewhere that American deployment of its preponder- 
ance of economic and military power "crystallized" the Cold 
46 War.   Gardner, in the same vein, intimates that the hand- 
ling of postwar economic aid to the Soviet Union and the 
American use of the atom bomb—and mishandling of atten- 
dant atomic energy questions—were important elements in the 
growth of tensions between the Soviet Union and the United 
47 States.   Thus a discussion of the particular instances of 
20 
economic and military diplomacy as presented in revisionist 
accounts would address concretely the thesis that the United 
States for economic reasons pursued a policy of expansion 
that ultimately conflicted with the legitimate security in- 
terests of the Soviet Union. 
The validity of this thesis can be analyzed by posing 
a number of questions in the discussion of specific in- 
stances of economic or military diplomacy.  These would be, 
(1) what motivated a specific American action?  (2) Did 
the action or event occur in the way it is portrayed in 
major revisionist accounts? and  (3) What was the impact of 
the action on Soviet-American relations?  It is hoped that 
these heuristic questions will help to answer the broader 
question of whether American policy was motivated by the 
•'Open Door" philosophy ascribed to it in revisionist ac- 
counts and whether American actions provoked Soviet-American 
tensions. 
It is recognized that a concentration on revisionist 
arguments regarding American use of preponderant military 
and economic strength is in some ways an artificial approach 
to the question and involves the neglect of other significant 
areas.  Nonetheless, this approach can shed light on argu- 
ments propounded by Kolko, Williams, and Gardner.  As much 
as possible, other significant themes relating to the origins 
of the Cold War will be discussed within the context of the 
•'preponderant strength" theme.  It will be necessary however, 
21 
to follow a discussion of the specific instances of economic 
and military diplomacy with brief, general discussions of 
the broader themes of the history of the origins of the Cold 
War in relation to the "preponderant strength" theme—in 
addition to drawing conclusions and advancing some methodo- 
logical criticisms. 
22 
CHAPTER 3:  ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY AND THE 
ORIGINS OF THE COLD WAR 
American initiatives concerning a postwar loan, German 
reparations, Lend-Lease aid, and eventually Marshall Plan 
aid are all portrayed in revisionist accounts as either 
direct or indirect attempts to "pressure" the Soviet Union 
to acquiesce in American wishes. 
One of the central "economic diplomacy" themes is that 
the United States sought to alter Soviet behavior by " . . . 
denying Russia economic aid, first from United States 
48 sources, then from German resources."   Kolko, for ex- 
ample, suggests that as World War II drew to a close, les- 
sened American dependence on Soviet military actions under- 
lay Averell Harriman's advice to Washington to use economic 
assistance as a bargaining counter—advice which was linked 
with a shift in policy from cooperation to opposition in 
49 American dealings with the Soviet Union.    It is a re- 
visionist article of faith that manipulation of offers of 
reconstruction loans from the United States and American 
reparations policies constituted attempts to "exploit 
50 Russian weakness"  and contributed to a worsening of 
American-Soviet relations.  The failure to work out a post- 
war program of assistance to the Soviet Union is portrayed 
as a lost opportunity to allay Soviet suspicions and help 
23 
- 51 that nation recover from the devastation of war.   Kolko 
asserts that the American policy of "using economic aid as 
an instrument of political and economic policy" meant that 
Soviet requests for loans, such as the six billion dollar 
request of January 1945, went unfulfilled because Wash- 
ington was unwilling to grant aid "save as part of a vast 
52 quid pro quo on global political and economic questions." 
Kolko notes that "economic experts in the State Department 
knew that without external aid Soviet recovery would be 
much slower and more painful, the result of a national ef- 
fort from a people already intensely weary and wounded." 
Kolko clearly indicates that outside of American aid, the' 
only other source of "assistance" for Russian reconstruc- 
tion was the extraction of reparations from Germany, and 
that American failure to come to terms over loans forced 
53 the Soviets to exercise this alternative.    In addition, 
Kolko suggests that failure to respond to Molotov's Janu- 
ary 1945 request reflected a feeling in Washington that a 
strong Russia was not in America's interest.  He cites 
Harriman's suggestion that "our basic interests might be 
better served by increasing our trade with other parts of 
the world."  According to Kolko, Harriman recommended a 
policy of "feigning" interest in granting a loan, but with 
numerous conditions attached—a stance which made any such 
54 grant "improbable." 
Williams similarly suggests that Stalin went to Yalta 
with two possible approaches to the postwar world in mind: 
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One was based on receiving a large loan 
from the United States ...  his other 
alternative was to obtain ... economic re- 
parations from Germany and a strong stra- 
tegic position in eastern Europe.55 
Instead of seeking a modus vivendi with the Soviet Union 
that would have involved economic aid and assurances of 
security,   the United States sought to apply the "Open 
Door" in Eastern Europe by bringing economic pressure to 
bear on the Soviet Union by manipulating the possibility of 
57 
a loan.   Averell Harriman's advice that assistance be 
dispensed in a manner that would exploit Russian weakness 
presaged Byrnes's unwillingness in 1945 to work out an 
agreement with Russia "that involved the recovery loan they 
58 had requested." 
Gardner suggests that Harriman and the State Depart- 
ment convinced President Roosevelt to take the "tactical 
point of view" which they had been urging on the matter of 
aid to the Soviet Union and forestalled consideration of 
Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau's proposal for a ten 
billion dollar loan—favoring instead the use of an offer 
of credit as "the only concrete bargaining lever" the United 
59 States had.   The only "hitch" in a policy of economic 
diplomacy was the possibility that Russia would resort to 
German reparations rather than American aid—a realization 
that underlay subsequent efforts to limit the extraction of 
reparations.   Gardner suggests that had the United States 
handled the question of economic aid differently, instead of 
25 
hoping that the economic lever "could have been used to 
force drastic changes in Russia's East European policy," 
some of the "worst" moments of the Cold War could have been 
avoided. 
Revisionist discussions of the loan question are highly 
speculative and rest on a questionable factual basis. Al- 
though the diplomatic use of credits and loans is portrayed 
as a manifestation of an American desire for economic ac- 
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cess to Eastern Europe,  the connection between this 
motivation and the actual discussions about the use of aid 
is not demonstrated. 
Kolko's unattributed assertion that State Department 
economists knew that Soviet recovery would be "much slower 
and more painful" without American assistance is directly 
contradicted by John Lewis Gaddis's description of a 1944 
Office of Strategic Services study concluding that "Soviet 
reconstruction would depend very little on foreign credit," 
and a 1945 State Department study estimating that, 
without receiving foreign loans and 
through only limited use of its gold re- 
serves the Soviet Union could, with the 
help of German reparations, regain its 
prewar level of capital investment by 
1948.  American credits would accelerate 
the process by only a matter of months.6^ 
Furthermore, Kolko advances no evidence to suggest that in 
the early part of 1945 American policy was to "feign" in- 
terest without genuine intent to extend credit.  It may 
well be that consideration of the Molotov request was 
26 
postponed for essentially political reasons, but Roosevelt's 
explanation of this was that he wished to talk with Stalin 
64 
at Yalta before taking a particular course of action. 
Harriman's advice to the State Department about Molotov's 
request, which had been proffered as a solution to impending 
American economic problems, was that the "unconventional 
form and unreasonable terms" of Molotov's request be ignored. 
He advised that the United States do everything to insure a 
sound Russian economy but also make clear that American co- 
operation depended in some measure on Soviet behavior. 
Harriman's opinions reflect neither a policy of "feigned" 
interest nor a feeling that a strong Russia was not in 
America's interest.  In fact, Harriman linked improved 
Soviet economic conditions with improved (from a Western 
standpoint) Soviet behavior in the world.    In addition to 
distorting Harriman's position, Kolko simply fails to tell 
his readers what the vast American quid pro quo he mentions 
was—or when and how it was communicated to Soviet leaders. 
Gardner and Williams correctly note that in early 1945 
American policy-makers considered using a postwar loan as a 
bargaining counter.  They do not, however, demonstrate that 
the United States was particularly clear in its purposes 
beyond the postponement of action on Molotov's request prior 
to the Yalta conference.  Gardner, for example, bases his 
assertion that American reparations policy represented an 
attempt to plug a possible hole in a policy of economic 
27 
diplomacy on an editorial in Nation pointing out that Russia 
could recover quite well using its own resources and German 
reparations.  Gardner proceeds from this to the assertion 
that subsequent policy statements on reparations reflected 
67 
an effort to "undo the hitch in economic diplomacy. " 
That American policy statements on reparations reflected 
a conscious effort to solidify the basis of economic diplo- 
macy is purely inferential.  Gardner provides no evidence 
that the policy statements he fleetingly mentions were an 
outgrowth of the particular line of reasoning he describes. 
In the same vein, Williams asserts that "failing to 
obtain a loan from America" Stalin was led to choose German 
68 
reparations as the solution to Russia's recovery problems. 
But he, too, offers no concrete evidence that the specific 
failure to come to terms on a loan underlay Soviet repara- 
tions policies, or thkt Stalin saw loans and reparations as 
an "either-or" proposition.  In fact, in April of 1945, 
Harriman had specifically written that there was little to 
suggest that even a reparations agreement would mitigate 
Soviet zeal in "removing vast quantities of goods" from 
Germany as the Red Army advanced.  Even in April of 1945, 
before the loan issue had been resolved in any fashion, the 
69 Soviet Union was stripping Germany.    In any case, re- 
visionist scholars offer no evidence that a loan would have 
mitigated Soviet removals or that the issue was ever dis- 
cussed in those terms.  In fact, Kolko notes that Soviet 
28 
loan requests were repeated in August 1945 and October 
70 1946.   This was well after the systematic stripping of 
Germany described in numerous accounts had begun—sug- 
gesting perhaps that reparations and loans were not seen 
as mutually exclusive in the Kremlin. 
Because Averell Harriman was perhaps the earliest and 
most vocal advocate of the use of American economic bar- 
gaining levers, it is worthwhile to examine the development 
of his views on the question.  In revisionist accounts 
Harriman is portrayed as "anti-Russian."  Williams, for 
example, says: 
Harriman's natural {[emphasis added] antag- 
onism to the Soviets was reinforced by his 
vigorous belief in the necessity of open- 
door expansion, a belief that may have been 
heightened even more by an unhappy experi- 
ence with the Russians in the 1920's, when 
his attempt to control a sizable segment of 
the world's manganese market by developing 
Russian supplies ended in mutual dissatis- 
faction. 7* 
Similar explanations of Harriman's anti-Russianness occur 
in other revisionist accounts. 
Interestingly, this quality of "anti-Russianness" was 
not perceived by the Russians.  Khrushchev, in his memoirs 
suggests that Harriman pursued policies "much to our 
liking," and that Harriman was "a highly realistic man, an 
experienced specialist who understood us, who stood for 
peaceful coexistence ..."  Khrushchev mentions that 
Stalin even considered compensating Harriman for his lost 
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manganese concession.   More importantly, we know from a 
variety of sources that Harriman's views on the use of an 
economic bargaining lever developed out of his specific 
experiences as ambassador.  George Kennan reports that in 
August 1944 Harriman returned from a meeting with Stalin 
in which Stalin refused to permit the dropping of supplies 
73 to the Warsaw Poles, "shattered by the experience." 
Lynn Davis reproduces a memo of August 1944 to the Secre- 
tary of State from Harriman, in which he said:  "For the 
first [emphasis addedj time since coming to Moscow I am 
gravely concerned by the attitude of the Soviet Government 
in its refusal to permit us to assist the Poles in War- 
74 
saw ..."   In a September 1944 cable to Harry Hopkins 
Harriman noted that, 
[ojur relations with the Soviets now that 
the end of the war is in sight have taken 
a startling turn ... The Soviets have held 
up our requests with complete indifference 
The time has come when we must make clear 
what we expect of the Soviets as the price 
of our goodwill. There is every indication 
that unless we take issue with the present 
policy the Soviet Union will become a world 
bully . . .75 
Herbert Feis notes that Harriman's experiences led him to 
conclude the impossibility of banking good will in Moscow 
and that a loan would probably have little lasting positive 
76 
effect on Soviet-American relations.   Rather than deri- 
ving from congenital antagonism to the Soviet Union, Har- 
riman's views derived specifically from his experiences in 
Moscow during the war. 
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To be sure, Roosevelt's postponement of consideration 
of a loan to the Soviet Union seems to have been politically 
motivated,  Roosevelt adopted a "wait-and-see" attitude 
toward Soviet behavior and sought to retain a possible bar- 
77 gaining lever with the Soviet Union.   But the connection 
between this action and the specific aims attributed to 
American policy by revisionist scholars is not clear. 
Herbert Feis notes that in the spring of 1945 the loan 
question was simply left "swinging in the breezes of diplo- 
78 
macy."   Whatever the motivation, this particular course 
of policy amounts, at most, to a sin of omission—it cannot 
fairly be characterized as a coercive policy requiring a 
vast quid pro quo from its intended victim.  The closest 
the United States seems to have come in the spring of 1945 
to an actual articulation of American conditions for 
economic assistance to the Soviet Union was in Truman's 
April 22 meeting with Molotov, which Truman describes in 
his memoirs: 
I explained to Molotov that in Roosevelt's 
last message to Marshal Stalin on April 1 
the late President had made it plain that 
no policy in the United States, whether 
foreign or domestic, could succeed unless 
it had public confidence and support. 
This, I pointed out, applied in the field 
of economic as well as political collaboration. 
In this country, I said, legislative ap- 
propriations were required for any economic 
measures in the foreign field, and I had no 
hope of getting such measures through Con- 
gress unless there was public support for 
them.  I expressed the hope that the Soviet 
Government would keep these factors in mind 
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in considering the request that joint British 
and American proposals be accepted, and that 
Mr. Molotov would be authorized to continue 
the discussions in San Francisco on that 
basis.79 
Truman's oblique threat was advanced in connection with an 
American communication to Stalin regarding the Yalta agree- 
ment on Poland.  The communication sought the invitation 
of a group of "democratic" Polish leaders to Moscow for 
consultations leading to "the establishment of a new Pro- 
visional Government of National Unity genuinely representa- 
80 tive of the democratic elements of the Polish people." 
Whether this diplomatic request and its accompanying 
threat of economic sanctions—however oblique—represented 
an essentially aggressive American stance in contrast to 
a moderate, nonideological Soviet posture, depends in large 
part on a definition of the nature of Soviet policy in 
Eastern Europe in the spring of 1945.  This will be dis- 
cussed later in the paper.  What is significant here is that 
Truman's indirect linkage of reconstruction assistance with 
Soviet behavior was made in connection with a particular 
political matter and was not related to a vast quid pro quo. 
Truman said nothing on this occasion even remotely related 
to the question of American economic access to Eastern 
Europe.  Truman's threat, such as it was, sought Stalin's 
81 
adherence to the Yalta agreement on Poland,   which had as 
its primary aim "the holding of free and unfettered elec- 
tions as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage 
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and secret ballot."   Whatever American economic needs and 
interests in Eastern Europe may have been, they were simply 
not articulated on one of the very few occasions when a 
representative of the United States government actually 
linked economic assistance with Soviet behavior in the 
presence of a representative of the Soviet government.  Had 
the United States had a well-defined policy of using 
economic diplomacy to preserve economic access to Eastern 
Europe and preclude "the Left" from power, as revisionist 
scholars assert, these matters would have been at least 
fleetingly mentioned when the club of economic assistance 
was actually being wielded.  Perhaps more significant than 
Truman1s failure to articulate the aims attributed to 
American policy by revisionist scholars, was the American 
failure, roughly one month after the Truman-Molotov meeting, 
to respond to the Soviet Union's negotiation of "extensive 
trade and commercial agreements with Bulgaria and Rumania, 
although these agreements virtually monopolized all Rumanian 
83 
and Bulgarian exports."   If American policy had been 
motivated largely by a desire for free trade, would not 
this Soviet action, which struck at the heart of principles 
of free trade, have provoked some sort of American response? 
Kolko, referring specifically to American policy toward 
Eastern Europe, asserts that, "The United States was 
especially alarmed that the Russians, via reparations agree- 
ments and joint companies, would establish a monopoly 
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position in the former Axis satellites."  He notes further, 
If American policy was vague on political 
demands for Eastern Europe, it was remark- 
ably precise in its economic goals.  If the 
Eastern European nations decided to embark 
on any radically new economic course, it 
would impinge in some manner on American 
objectives . . .84 
Kolko cites no evidence to support the assertion that the 
"United States was especially [emphasis addedj alarmed" at 
the Soviet establishment of a monopoly relationship with 
former Axis nations.  He fails to mention the American fail- 
ure to respond to the Soviet actions in Rumanian and 
Bulgaria, which might well be characterized as radical new 
economic courses for those nations—and certainly inimical 
to the economic objectives attributed to American policy. 
However vague American political demands may have been, 
Truman's blunt discussion with Molotov, complete with the 
veiled threat to withhold economic assistance, centered 
specifically on the essentially political matter of the com- 
position of the Polish government.  The Soviet conclusion 
of bilateral trade arrangements with Bulgaria and Rumania 
provoked no such American behavior.  Accounts of the Hopkins 
mission to Moscow in July of 1945 by those who sat in on 
his meetings with Stalin (Bohlen and Harriman) indicated 
that the discussions centered once again on the composition 
of the Polish government.  Neither Harriman nor Bohlen 
mention anything about the recently concluded trade agree- 
85 
ments.   One might speculate that had the Soviet action 
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"especially" alarmed American policy-makers, it might at 
least have been mentioned in a meeting between Stalin and a 
special emissary of the American president. 
Truman's April meeting with Molotov demonstrates the 
central role Poland played in the deterioration of Soviet- 
American relations in the spring of 1945.  Averell Harriman, 
for example, recounts that he "discussed the future of 
Poland with Stalin more often than any other single sub- 
86 ject."   Bohlen notes that at Yalta, Poland was "the most- 
difficult question of all" and that the Western objective 
was "absurdly simple—the right of the Poles to govern them- 
87 
selves, even if they chose a Communist government." 
Bohlen's memoirs indicate that American policy-makers clear- 
ly felt that the unwillingness of the Soviet government to 
invite non-Lublin Poles to Moscow for consultations leading 
to reorganization of the Lublin government constituted a 
violation of the Yalta agreement on Poland.  His account 
also indicates that the Soviet actions in Poland in the 
spring of 1945 provoked doubts about the possibility of 
88 dealing with the Soviet Union.   Following Roosevelt's 
death, Harriman flew to Washington to specifically ensure 
that Truman "understood that Stalin was already failing to 
keep his Yalta commitment."  He records that Truman 
grasped the importance of the Polish 
problem and took the opportunity of 
Molotov's call ... to impress on him, 
perhaps too bluntly, the United States' 
insistence that the Yalta agreement be 
carried out.89 
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The preceding exposition suggests that Truman's blunt 
treatment of Molotov in April of 1945 was connected largely 
with political rather than economic concerns and had ante- 
cedents in Soviet behavior as it was perceived by American 
policy-makers. 
The loan issue left swinging in the breeze in spring 
and summer of 1945 surfaced again in February of 1946, when, 
according to Thomas G. Paterson, the United States communi- 
cated to the Soviets a desire to reopen discussion of out- 
standing issues, among them the question of a $1 billion 
credit.  The American note to the Soviet government sug- 
gested discussion of policies that would assist 
the peoples liberated from the domination 
of Nazi Germany and the peoples of former 
Axis satellite states of Europe to solve 
by democratic means their pressing economic 
problems.90 
A Soviet reply to the American message, while agreeing to 
a discussion of a number of matters, did not mention the 
Eastern European matters implied in the above quotation 
and was met with a letter from Secretary of State Byrnes 
which linked the $1 billion credit with "the creation of an 
international economic environment permitting a large 
volume of trade and expanding mutually beneficial economic 
91 
relations among nations." 
Surprisingly, neither Williams nor Gardner discuss the 
handling of the loan question in 1946.  Yet this instance 
of economic diplomacy, if taken alone, might indicate that 
36 
the United States had a policy of using the possibility of 
economic assistance to promote a global economy based on 
multilateral trade.  Only Kolko cites the Byrnes letter of 
April 1946 mentioned above, saying that American officials 
"persisted in the strategy of linking the matter [the loan] 
to an omnibus agreement on an economic policy that neither 
92 
a socialist nor a capitalist nation was likely to accept." 
A more thorough reading of the sections of the Foreign 
Relations series dealing with the loan question in 1946 in- 
dicates that American policy-makers did indeed ponder using 
the Soviet loan request to alter Soviet economic policies 
in Eastern Europe.  Elbridge Durbrow, in a memorandum of 
January 1946, lamented the weakening of the American bar- 
gaining position "with regard to the economic blackout in 
Eastern Europe" because of a $400 million Lend-Lease settle- 
93 
ment and UNRRA benefits extended to the Soviets.  Durbrow*s 
memo was written in support of a Harriman telegram which 
advocated not making "isolated economic arrangements" 
94 pending an "over-all" economic understanding.   Harriman 
added that an understanding should be reached, "at least 
regarding the manner in which outstanding economic questions 
95 
are to be adjusted." 
The Byrnes letter which Paterson cites, while stating 
that it would be virtually impossible to discuss a loan 
without discussing certain other questions relating to the 
"sound development" of "mutually beneficial economic 
37 
relations among nations," did not overtly link a loan to a 
specific Soviet position as Truman did with Molotov in 
96 1945.   The loan was linked with discussion of outstanding 
economic issues.  It is clear however, that in this case, 
the United States did use its bargaining lever to attempt 
to bring Soviet economic behavior closer to the American 
position, which did envision expanding trade among nations. 
But the particular points Byrnes sought to discuss in con- 
nection with a loan do not indicate a narrow, self-interest- 
ed desire on the part of the United States "to solve its 
own dilemmas through reorganizing the world economy" or an 
expectation that other nations "agree to commit economic 
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suicide by accepting the American program."   The point 
dealing with Eastern Europe sought to determine joint 
British-Soviet-American policies to solve the economic 
98 problems of former Axis states.   Of course documents 
meant for foreign consumption are unlikely to articulate 
crass self-interest.  Kolko, who uses the phrase "economic 
suicide," does not explain how American economic aims in the 
world required other nations—particularly Britain and 
Russia—to destroy themselves.  Asserting that it was 
"predictable in advance" that other nations would not agree 
to self-destruction, Kolko says that Cordell Hull saw the 
problems of the postwar world "from the viewpoint of the 
99 problems and needs of American economic interests."   What- 
ever Hull's viewpoint may have been, it did not dictate 
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that other nations agree to economic suicide.  The very 
essence of his thinking—thinking mirrored in some measure 
in the Byrnes letter—was that the lowering of trade bar- 
riers would encourage higher living standards in all 
countries and eliminate the economic jealousy that he saw 
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as a cause of war. 
In any case, the terms attached to the loan offer in 
1946 were sufficient, Herbert Feis suggests, to snuff out 
the possibility of coming to agreement.    The effect of 
this is hard to determine.  While revisionist scholars por- 
tray the failure as evidence of a "hard" American policy 
toward the Soviet Union, and generally stress the issue in 
assigning greater responsibility for the growth of tensions 
between the two nations to the United States, they do not 
demonstrate its specific impact.  Discussions of the impact 
of the failure focus largely on what a loan could have ac- 
complished had the United States correctly understood Soviet 
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aims and hopes in the world.    Even the linkage of a 
failure to come to terms on economic aid and Soviet repara- 
tions policy is speculative.  Thomas Paterson captures the 
spirit of these speculations on the failure of the loan 
discussions:  "The proposed American loan to Russia was 
never given the opportunity to demonstrate whether it could 
serve as a peace potion for easing increasingly bitter 
Soviet-American relations." Although he says that the 
diplomatic use of economic power is to be expected and can 
39 
be helpful, Paterson suggests that if "that power thwarts 
negotiations or is employed to buttress demands which alone 
are held to be the sine qua non for peaceful settlement, 
103 the result is schism and conflict."    This last statement 
may be true, but it does not reflect events as they happened 
or even as portrayed in revisionist accounts.  Paterson1s 
own account argues only that American demands were held to 
be the sine qua non for a $1 billion credit—not for a 
"peaceful settlement."  Whatever the tensions between the 
Soviet Union and United States may have been in 1946, the 
two countries were not at war.  If American demands thwarted 
anything, they thwarted the possibility of a loan to the 
Soviet Union.  Had American "economic power" not existed, 
the whole question of credits (and attendant negotiations) 
would not have arisen. 
In revisionist accounts of the origins of the Cold War, 
including Paterson's more detailed study of specific econo- 
mic issues, the effect of the failure of the Soviet Union 
and the United States to come to terms on a loan is never 
made clear.  But it is implied that American policy-makers 
haltingly attempted to use assistance as a diplomatic weapon 
and that as a result relations between the two nations 
worsened over time. 
Lend Lease Controversy 
Perhaps because it is a case in which an American 
action produced a demonstrably negative Soviet response, one 
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of the most frequently cited examples of "economic diplo- 
macy" cited in revisionist histories is the American Lend- 
Lease cancellation of May 12, 1945.  Kolko, Williams, and 
Gardner all portray the Lend-Lease cutoff as an attempt by 
the United States to make the Soviet Union aware of a wil- 
lingness to use economic might to alter Soviet behavior, 
Gardner describes Truman's oblique hints to Molotov in 
their April 1945 meeting that postwar assistance depended 
upon Soviet behavior, an admonition that Gardner suggests 
"was given more substance a few weeks later when Washington 
abruptly cut off Lend-Lease aid following the German sur- 
render."  Gardner argues that "Truman wanted to sensitize 
the Russians to America's economic ability to reward its 
friends and discourage its adversaries."  Gardner dismisses 
the argument that the Soviet Union had few grounds for com- 
plaint in view of the $11 billion of aid previously trans- 
ferred from the United States with the reasoning that, 
(1) the Soviets had more than paid their 
way in blood and treasure, and (2) both 
sides knew that there would be a new account 
sheet started after the war, based on trial 
political balances. 
In any case, the bluntness of Stalin's reaction indicated 
that Truman had sensitized him to American willingness to 
exercise its economic might. 
Kolko sets his version of the cancellation in the con- 
text of the May 1945 impasse over Anglo-American unwilling- 
ness to deal with the Warsaw Provisional Government: 
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In this setting Washington chose to apply 
pressures on the Russians via a manipula- 
tion of the Lend-Lease program, a policy 
Harriman had been urging and with which 
John Grew agreed.105 
While he does concede that the cutoff affected Great Britain 
more than the Soviet Union and that the abruptness of the 
cutoff, which had involved the recall of ships from the high 
seas, had been mitigated by later actions, Kolko unequivo- 
cally states that "Insofar as the discussions concerned the 
Russians, they were set entirely in the context of pressur- 
ing them along lines Harriman advised." 
Williams suggests that the knowledge of America's 
great absolute as well as relative advantage 
in both economic and military power ... 
encouraged Truman and other leaders after 
1945 to think that they could force the Soviets 
to accept American proposals without recourse 
to war. 
Williams asserts that "a strong view prevailed" in Washing- 
ton's approach to Moscow:  "Thus, for example, additional 
lend-lease allocations and shipments to Russia were canceled 
in May 1945."  Williams notes further that "on a comparative 
basis, Russia was treated far less considerately than 
107 England and France during the process of termination." 
Thomas Paterson, while acknowledging the domestic con- 
siderations involved in the cutback decision, suggests that 
it "must be viewed within the context of the administra- 
tion's thinking about economic power as diplomatic lever- 
age."  Paterson asserts that the interpretation of the Lend- 
Lease legislation that dictated an abrupt cancellation, 
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derived from the assumption that economic 
power as a diplomatic weapon would make the 
Russians pliable; a different assumption 
would have produced a different interpretation. 
He suggests further that American officials expected an ir- 
ritated Soviet reaction, hoped a cutback would affect Soviet 
behavior, and simply wanted the affair handled gently enough 
to forestall charges of economic diplomacy.  The execution 
of the decision made the "application of economic pres- 
108 
sure ... quite conspicuous and naked." 
The interpretation of the Lend-Lease cutoff that stres- 
ses its coercive aspects has been comprehensively disputed 
by George C. Herring, who asserts that the versions advan- 
ced by Kolko, Williams, Gardner, and others, all contain 
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substantial errors of fact and omission. 
Gardner and Paterson, for example, neglect to tell 
their readers that the Lend-Lease cutoff was not solely 
directed at the Soviet Union and applied to all nations re- 
ceiving American aid.    Williams never makes clear that 
the cutoff applied to all nations and that it followed the 
German surrender.  On this point Kolko is somewhat more 
faithful to actual events when he mentions the impact of the 
cancellation on Great Britain, but with his assertion that 
discussions preceding the cutoff were set entirely in the 
context of coercive use of economic power, he skates on 
thin ice. 
Herring's version of the Lend-Lease cancellation il- 
luminates areas of the question rarely mentioned by 
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revisionist historians, among them, the domestic and legis- 
lative constraints on the continuance of aid after the ces- 
sation of hostilities, the special care and sensitivity ac- 
corded to Lend-Lease dealings with the Soviet Union by 
American policy-makers, and the errors of policy execution 
that made the cutoff unnecessarily abrupt. 
A decline in public support for the Lend-Lease pro- 
gram and public opposition to the continuation of such aid 
programs after the cessation of hostilities prompted con- 
gressional efforts to prevent the renewal of the program 
in February of 1945. Although the program was renewed, 
"House Republicans forced the administration to accept an 
amendment to the act which explicitly stated that Lend-Lease 
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could not be used for postwar purposes."    Domestic poli- 
tical considerations growing out of the strong public op- 
position to Lend-Lease, as well as the terms of the legis- 
lation dealing with it, had much to do with the May 12 can- 
cellation. 
Truman admits in his memoirs that he signed the actual 
cutoff order, which took a very rigid interpretation of the 
113 terms of the legislation, without reading it.    When high 
officials realized how zealously the order had been execu- 
ted, they immediately prevailed upon Truman to countermand 
it.114 
This is not to suggest that the possibility of using 
Lend-Lease coercively was not discussed.  Herring describes 
the change in official thinking about American-Soviet 
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relations, an evolution in which Averell Harriman did 
counsel greater American wariness in dealings with the 
Soviet Union and suggested the possibility that economic 
assistance could be advanced on a quid pro quo basis: 
It is quite true that some State Department 
officials discussed the possibility of 
using lend-lease as an instrument of coer- 
cion.  Harriman himself had suggested the 
same possibility in 1944.  Those respon- 
sible for initiating the policy change 
were more cautious, however, because they 
feared that a rupture on the lend-lease 
issue might jeopardize the delicate nego- 
tiations then taking place at San Francisco 
on the Polish question and the organization- 
al structure of the United Nations.H5 
In fact, Harriman and Edward Stettinius "discussed the pos- 
sible impact of the lend-lease reduction on other issues," 
agreeing that "no acts of pressure should be 'suggested or 
considered' until after the San Francisco Conference." They 
also agreed that adjustments in Lend-Lease aid occasioned 
by the cessation of hostilities be made "without any hint of 
relationship with the Polish or other political problems 
li fi 
with the Soviet Union." ±0 
It is important to point out that Lend-Lease assistance 
to the Soviet Union had had unique status in that it was un- 
conditional. American officials had given priority to, and 
had been singularly uncritical of, Soviet requests for mat- 
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erial assistance during the war.    Harriman's recommenda- 
tions on the possible coercive use of Lend-Lease aid cen- 
tered first on the adoption of a "firm but friendly" quid 
pro quo approach that would have involved reductions in the 
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unconditional status of assistance—rather than abrupt or 
arbitrary cutoffs.  The "firm but friendly" approach evolv- 
ed from reported abuse of the unconditional aid policy, 
continued secretiveness in Soviet dealings with the United 
States, and indications that unconditional assistance, 
rather than encouraging friendliness, had prompted greater 
Soviet aggressiveness because it was interpreted as a 
118 
"sign of weakness." 
Herring concludes: 
Truman's decision to reduce lend-lease 
after V-E Day did not discriminate 
against the Soviets.  It did not mark an 
abandonment of American attempts to co- 
operate with Russia, nor was it interided 
to coerce the Soviets.  The lend-lease 
cutback was general; it applied to all 
nations.  The reason the Russian aid pro- 
gram required separate handling before 
V-E Day was the unique status it had been 
given at the beginning of the war. ... 
The termination of the unconditional aid 
policy did not mean Truman had ended 
Roosevelt's policy of attempting to co- 
operate with the Russians.  Harriman and 
Truman believed, on the contrary, that 
the unconditional aid policy had jeopar- 
dized their objective.  Only if the United 
States demonstrated a determination to 
defend its own interests could a sound 
basis for postwar cooperation be construc- 
ted ... There is no evidence whatever 
that the May 11 decision was designed to 
drive the Russians from Eastern Europe. 
From time to time some of Truman's advisers 
had suggested such a course.  But after 
V-E Day, Harriman had underscored the need 
for caution in handling lend-lease to avoid 
any break during the San Francisco con- 
ference ... No attempt was made during 
the period from V-E Day to V-J Day to ex- 
tort concessions, large or small, in re- 
turn for American materials.119 
It is worthwhile to deal at length with the Lend-Lease 
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cancellation because it did demonstrably antagonize the 
Soviet Union.  When Harry Hopkins met with Stalin on May 
27, 1945, Stalin described the manner of the cutback as, 
"unfortunate and even brutal," and characterized it as an 
attempt to "pressure" the Soviet Union—even though he ad- 
mitted he was aware that cessation of hostilities would 
120 
mean a reduction in aid.    Similarly, Nikita Khrushchev, 
in the second volume of his memoirs, describes the "bitter 
experience with the Americans over Lend-Lease," suggesting 
that the Americans cared little about "the blood we'd shed 
121 in the fight against our common enemy." 
Kolko's assertions that "key leaders in Washington un- 
derstood that they were applying economic tools for political 
ends" and that "Hopkins feigned innocence" in his meeting 
122 
with Stalin notwithstanding,    it is ironic that one of the 
few instances in which a specific American action provoked 
a documented Soviet reaction was in fact largely unrelated 
to economic coercion.  Furthermore, Stalin's remarks should 
not necessarily be taken at face value—as revisionist 
scholars, who assail American acceptance at face value of 
123 the Jacobin rhetoric of some communist leaders,   would 
doubtless agree.  Harriman's account of his first meeting 
with Stalin in 1941 describes instances in which Stalin was 
"brutally critical" of meager American offers of wartime 
assistance, implying that the Americans and British wished 
to see the Soviet Union defeated.  Stalin on this occasion 
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rejected Harriman's explanations of the difficulties in- 
volved in supplying specific items, especially on short 
notice: 
Why is it that the United States can only 
offer one thousand tons of armor plate for 
tanks, a country with a production of over 
fifty million tons of steel? 
Harriman's specific explanation of the amount of time re- 
quired to increase capacity for certain types of steel was 
124 brushed aside with, "One only has to add some alloys." 
Harriman recounts numerous similar instances in which 
125 Stalin crudely impugned Western or American purposes. 
The first instance, mentioned above, happened well before 
many of the occurrences frequently associated with the 
growth of tensions between the Soviet Union and the United 
States, such as the failure to open the Second Front.  This 
is not to suggest that Stalin was necessarily hostile in 
1941, but simply that the remarks he used with Hopkins did 
not represent a new departure in Soviet diplomacy.  One 
might note in passing that Stalin's remarks in 1941 do 
represent a peculiar way of dealing with representatives 
of nations offering unsolicited military assistance to a 
nation struggling to survive a major invasion.  If either 
Britain or the United States had wanted the Soviet Union 
defeated, an easier solution was close to hand. 
In any case, the revisionist interpretation of the Lend- 
Lease cancellation conflicts with more complete accounts of 
what actually happened. The revisionists neglect whole 
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aspects of the question and impute a specific motivation to 
the cutoff without any directly supporting evidence. Gar 
Alperovitz, who uses the Lend-Lease cutoff as an example of 
a change in American policy from conciliation to confronta- 
tion with the Soviet Union, provides a good example of this 
when he suggests that Truman "later characterized his first 
attempt to utilize economic bargaining strength through 
1 ?fi Lend-Lease as a 'mistake.'"    In his memoirs Truman 
described the abrupt execution of the cancellation order as 
"unfortunate," acknowledged that he had learned a lesson 
about reading documents before signing them, and recalled 
Hopkins's assurances to Stalin that the cutoff was not an 
127 
attempt to pressure the Soviet Union.    Alperovitz, not 
Truman, characterized the cutoff as an attempt to utilize 
economic bargaining strength. 
It seems clear then, that one of the most frequently 
cited examples in support of one the central revisionist 
contentions does not in fact support that contention. 
Reparations and Postwar Reconstruction 
The revisionist assertion that American policy on re- 
parations was part of a broader policy of economic diplo- 
macy is also without foundation.  Kolko suggests that, "A 
high level of German reparations available to Russia ... 
would exclude the United States as the major source for the 
128 
reconstruction of the world economy."    Williams similarly 
suggests that the* United States sought to avoid "any indirect 
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129 financing of Soviet recovery."    Gardner1s version has 
been recounted previously in this paper, but essentially he 
asserts that American reparations policy derived from a de- 
130 
sire to maintain economic leverage over the Soviet Union. 
Harry Truman clearly links American unwillingness to 
place a specific figure on reparations from Germany with 
American unwillingness to underwrite reparations as had hap- 
pened (in the American view) after World War I.  He writes 
that "we remembered that after 1919 Germany was so enfeebl- 
ed that only American money made it possible to pay the re- 
131 parations that had been imposed."    Truman suggests that 
American policy sought to deprive the Germans of the ability 
to make war but leave "sufficient means to provide a mini- 
mum subsistence level without sustained outside (which 
132 
could only mean American) relief."    Bohlen similarly re- 
counts that at Potsdam, "The Americans were determined not 
to get trapped, as in World War I, in paying for Germany's 
133 
reparations to other countries."    There is nothing to 
suggest that this explanation was offered insincerely or 
that the United States hoped to manipulate the reparations 
question to alter Soviet behavior. 
In revisionist accounts the Marshall Plan is portrayed 
as a logical development in the continuing American effort 
to maintain an open world in which to invest and market sur- 
plus production.  Kolko, for example, argues that 
|V)y June 1948 the United States had embarked 
on its ambitious program to reconstruct Euro- 
pean capitalism in a manner that could sustain 
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American trade, so vital to the very survival 
of American capitalism ... Unable to alter 
its internal economic priorities, American 
capitalism could only turn outward, not with 
disinterested aid but with new designs to 
save itself.*^4 
Kolko suggests that the European recovery of 1946 "involved 
far less guidance and participation than that nation could 
afford," and that by 1947 the United States was seeking 
means to "reverse the much more prevalent economic policy 
of trade restrictionism, autarchy, and European suf- 
135 ficiency."    Thus the United States "came to believe" 
that a "system of grants ... could restructure an ideal 
world capitalist trading structure ... able to purchase 
1 36 
America^ vast surplus."    Kolko argues further that the 
Truman administration, despite its internal admissions that 
the Marshall Plan was not directed at a communist threat 
specifically, "conjured up the bolshevik threat" for pub- 
137 lie consumption."    Congress, rather than Eastern Europe— 
which had by 1947 been written off, was the threat. Lest 
Congress not provide "essential funding" with which the ad- 
ministration hoped "to secure its economic aims," a Red 
138 Scare and crisis mentality was fostered. 
The Marshall Plan offer had an important impact on the 
Soviet Union.  Molotov attended the Paris meeting of foreign 
ministers to discuss the proposal, decided that the pro- 
posals being discussed by the British and French would have 
involved "unprecedented interference in the internal affairs 
of sovereign states," had his proposals rejected by the 
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139 British and French, and left.    Kolko argues that after 
the Paris meeting the Russians started to "consolidate 
their international position and to offer aid and trade 
agreements to neighboring states." 
Williams argues that the Marshall Plan cannot be seen 
as "solely" humanitarian, pointing out that despite great 
need, China and Latin America were excluded.  As does Kolko, 
Williams portrays the Marshall Plan as a way of forestal- 
ling the loss of foreign markets, and suggests that Secre- 
tary of State Marshall assumed that the program "offered 
141 the only solution to America's economic difficulties." 
The Russians, Williams asserts, 
clearly interpreted the Marshall Plan 
as the over-all economic equivalent of 
Baruch's proposal on atomic energy.  It 
was to them an American strategy for set- 
ting and maintaining conditions on econ- 
omic development in eastern Europe and 
the Soviet Union.  That estimate prompt- 
ed them first to refuse to participate, 
and then to embark upon a series of ac- 
tions which most Americans mistakenly 
think had already occurred.  They initia- 
ted a program of general political repres- 
sion in Rumania.  They sharply curtailed 
freedom of the press in Bulgaria, Rumania, 
and eastern Germany.  They shot the Pea- 
sant Party leader Patlov in Bulgaria. 
And within the year the Communist Party in 
Czechoslovakia seized a monopoly of poli- 
tical power.142 
Thus for revisionists, the Marshall Plan seems to be the 
last straw in a policy of economic diplomacy growing out 
of essentially domestic needs of American capitalism. 
While there is a measure of truth in the revisionist 
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treatment of the Marshall Plan, it is not clear that the 
policy was essentially a reflection of domestic economic 
needs or an effort to "restore the institutions of the old 
143 
order on an inter-European basis." 
George Kennan, who headed the Policy Planning Staff 
at the State Department, which did much of the research 
leading to the Marshall Plan, describes the origins of the 
program in his memoirs.  Kennan recounts that Secretary of 
State Marshall returned from the Moscow meeting of the 
Council of Foreign Ministers in April of 1947, "shaken by 
the realization of the seriousness and urgency of the plight 
of Western Europe ... where something approaching total 
144 
economic disintegration seemed now to be imminent."    He 
notes further that Marshall's experience in Moscow led him 
to feel that "the Soviet leaders had a political interest 
in seeing the economies of the Western European peoples fail 
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under anything other than Communist leadership."    Kennan 
describes the reasons for the American insistence that the 
initiative in planning and organizing a reconstruction pro- 
gram come from the Europeans and that such a program be a 
joint program "agreed to by several European nations."  He 
cites the original memorandum: 
It would be neither fitting nor efficacious 
for this nation to draw up unilaterally and 
to promulgate formally ... a program de- 
signed to place Western Europe on its feet 
economically.  This is the business of the 
Europeans ... The program which this 
country is asked to support ... must, for 
psychological as well as economic reasons, 
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be an internationally agreed upon pro- 
gram.146 
Kennan suggests that there were two reasons for the require- 
ment that such a program be internationally agreed upon. 
The first was that the United States would have faced "a 
whole series of competing national demands" which would 
have forced the United States to make politically unpopular 
decisions, had the international requirement not been in- 
sisted on.  The second reason was that, 
We considered that one of the long-term 
deficiencies of the European economy as 
a whole was its excessive fragmentation 
... the lack, in particular, of a 
large consumer's market.147 
Clearly, in Kennan's account, the United States did advocate 
multilateral economic organization for Europe.  The reasons 
he cites in particular have more to do with fostering 
European recovery however, than with asserting American 
control or solving American dilemmas.  Marshall seems to 
have been genuinely disturbed by economic conditions in 
Europe rather than a recovery in which the United States 
had had scant influence—for which Kolko offers no evidence. 
Kolko's assertion that within the government it was 
recognized that the Marshall Plan was not a means of com- 
bating communism and that communism was not at the root of 
European economic problems is based on a citation from the 
same paper Kennan cites.  The quotations as used in Kolko 
and Kennan support contradictory conclusions.  Kolko 
quotes: 
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Lthe State Department] ... did not see com- 
munist activities as the root of the present 
difficulties in Western Europe ... American 
effort to Europe should be directed not to 
the combatting of communism as such but to 
the restoration of the economic health and 
vigor of European society.14** 
Kennan's version is somewhat different: 
the paper recognized ... that the Communists 
are exploiting the European crisis and that 
further Communist successes would create ser- 
ious danger to American security.  It (the 
Staff) considers, however, that American ef- 
fort in aid to Europe should be directed not 
to the combatting of communism as such but to 
the restoration of the economic health and 
vigor of European society.  It should aim, in 
other words, not to combat communism but the 
economic maladjustment which makes European 
society vulnerable to exploitation by any and 
all totalitarian movements and which Russian 
communism is now exploiting.149 
The more complete quotation suggests that the "bolshevik 
threat" which Kolko argues was simply "conjured up" for 
public consumption, was very much on the minds of those 
writing a paper that helped lay the foundations of the 
Marshall Plan.  It is important to point out that while the 
threat was perceived and was not simply conjured up as a 
political expedient, much evidence suggests that the theme 
of a communist threat was manipulated and exaggerated by 
150 the Truman administration.    Nonetheless, it is a comment 
on Kolko's scholarship that he uses a quotation to prove the 
opposite of what it says when ellipses are filled in and an 
additional sentence added. 
Bohlen, who attended Marshall's meeting with Stalin in 
April of 1947 and drafted the speech Marshall delivered at 
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the Harvard commencement, describes the development of the 
program much as Kennan does, citing particularly the "deep 
impression" Stalin's "seeming indifference to what was hap- 
pening in Germany" made. 
Both Bohlen and Kennan indicate that the origins of 
The Marshall Plan lay in perceptions of the economic devas- 
tation in Europe and in the impression that Stalin was con- 
tent to "let matters drift" as the best way of advancing 
152 Soviet interests.    There is scant mention in their dis- 
cussion of the Marshall Plan of a vast American surplus of 
goods, for which markets had to be assured.  In fact, Bohlen 
points out that "the United States was short of many of the 
153 items which were to be included in the Marshall Plan." 
American self-interest was a component of the thinking 
behind the memorandum cited by Kolko and Kennan, but the re- 
ference was to security, not expanded markets for American 
goods.  The irony of the revisionist anajlysis of the pur- 
pose of the Marshall plan is that the public statements of 
economic self-interest made by Marshall before Congress and 
154 business groups that they cite,   were not reflected in the 
internal process of policy formulation.  One might speculate 
that these remarks were intended to smooth the passage of 
legislation. 
In revisionist accounts, the impact of the Marshall 
Plan on Soviet foreign policy is not specifically demon- 
strated; it is merely implied.  Williams, for example, of- 
fers no direct evidence that Soviet perception of a 
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particular purpose in the program prompted the repressive 
155 
series of Soviet actions he describes.    Kolko merely as- 
serts that it was in the "general context" of the post- 
Paris meeting period that the Soviets moved to consolidate 
their international position. 
Adam Ulam fills the gap by suggesting that by the time 
of the founding meeting of the Cominform in September 1947, 
"Soviet suspicion about the real purpose of the Marshall 
Plan had hardened into conviction." 
The real goals of the plan, the Russians 
argued ... had little to do with economic 
rehabilitation, not even with stopping the 
spread of Communism in the West; the real 
aim was an aggressive one:  to lay down the 
economic base for political and military 
pressures against Eastern Europe.157 
Ulam suggests that Stalin's perception of the dangers posed 
by the Marshall Plan—the magnetic effect on the satellites 
of a prosperous West, the need to divulge economic informa- 
tion in the event of Soviet participation in the Plan, and 
the domestic political problem of reconciling anti-bourgeois 
vigilance with incoming American billions—underlay Stalin's 
efforts to secure the satellites and redirect the efforts 
of Western Communists from attempting to gain power to 
158 
simple disruption. 
The promulgation of the Marshall Plan did, it seems, 
help provoke a reinforcement of the Soviet position in 
Eastern Europe.  To argue, however, as revisionist scholars 
do, that this was the frustrated response of a nation whose 
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previous foreign policies were essentially moderate and 
pluralistic, to a consistent pattern of aggressive behavior 
on the part of the United States, requires the neglect or 
redefinition of numerous Soviet actions and policies which 
underlay American actions.  The Marshall Plan clearly had 
as underpinnings, a perception of Europe in distress, and 
an assumption about the nature of Soviet intentions in the 
world.  The policy was defensive inasmuch as it sought to 
forestall communist exploitation of economic conditions in 
Western Europe.  It was not motivated by a desperate 
American desire to insure markets for American goods. 
The Marshall Plan was an example of economic diplomacy. 
It sought to achieve diplomatic ends through the manipula- 
tion of economic power.  It was not, however, part of a 
broader pattern of American economic diplomacy—a pattern 
in which American economic power was clumsily and in- 
flexibly wielded to secure carefully defined American aims. 
Although revisionist historians clearly assert the exis- 
tence of such a policy and assign it a major role in the 
growth of tensions between the Soviet Union and the United 
States, the examples cited do not in many cases substan- 
tiate the broader assertion.  In the cases of the Lend- 
Lease cancellation, American reparations policy, and post- 
war loans, a specific motivation is imputed rather than 
demonstrated, and the impact of a particular action is 
seldom demonstrated.  While American policy-makers discussed 
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and on occasion exercised economic bargaining power, they 
did not formulate a coherent, long-range policy with clear 
objectives. 
The contention that Soviet policy became militant 
"only" in 1947 after the United States had sought to secure 
an "open door" in Eastern Europe using "many means of pres- 
159 
sure"   rests on a demonstration that pressure was exerted 
to fulfill this objective, and on a demonstration that 
Soviet policy until 1947 was indeed moderate.  Although 
this last point will be dealt with later in the paper, the 
existence of a clear policy of using economic pressure is 
simply not demonstrated. 
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CHAPTER 4:  AMERICAN MILITARY STRENGTH—ITS 
USES AND EFFECTS IN THE ORIGINS 
OF THE COLD WAR 
The companion to the revisionist theme that the United 
States pursued a policy of "economic diplomacy" is the 
thesis that the United States deployed its military power 
in a manner consistent with the assumptions and objectives 
of the "Open Door."  Particularly important strands of this 
theme include the handling of the German surrender, the 
earlier Italian surrender, and the reasons for the use of 
the atom bomb and its effect on American diplomacy toward 
the Soviet Union.  American failure to mount the Second 
Front offensive in 1942, while cited as a source of greater 
Soviet-American tension in most histories of the period, is 
not portrayed in revisionist accounts as an attempt to alter 
Soviet behavior or as motivated (at least on the part of 
the United States) by economic or political considerations. 
Gardner suggests that the failure to open a front, as pro- 
mised by Roosevelt in 1942, led to Soviet suspicions that 
the United States and Britain would let Russia take "the 
heart and iron out of the German army" before dashing across 
160 Europe.    He does not, however, question the fact that the 
United States wanted to open a Second Front against Germany 
and was stymied by British unwillingness.    The negative 
consequences of the two-year gap in Allied promise and 
60 
performance for Soviet-American relations have been recorded 
in numerous accounts, but few assert that this failure of 
American action was the overriding cause of future disagree- 
ments.  Adam Ulam notes that the Normandy landing of 1944 
did much to dispel Soviet bitterness at carrying a greater 
share of the military burden, and was met with effusive 
162 praise from Stalin himself. 
While Gardner and Williams concentrate their attention 
on atomic diplomacy, Kolko deals at some length with the 
political motivation underlying American wartime strategy 
and the handling of the German surrender.  He argues that 
American strategy during the war was aimed at mitigating 
the consequences of Soviet military actions in Europe and 
Germany especially.  Since Germany was "far more consequen- 
tial to the future of world politics than control of the 
Balkans," the United States formulated a plan entitled 
RANKIN which involved a hasty rush across Europe in the 
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event of a premature German collapse.    Although Kolko 
asserts that this politically inspired plan was conceived 
to "solve the dilemmas of Soviet military domination in 
164 Europe,"   he offers no direct evidence that this was so. 
In fact, the plan, as described in a summary for the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff in August 1943, specifically envisioned 
that the plan was "to be carried out in cooperation with the 
Russians." 
Another example of politically motivated military 
decisions which Kolko cites is the American failure to 
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advance to Prague in May of 1945.  Kolko asserts that the 
decision was motivated by an unwillingness to "aid what the 
Americans understood to be a Communist-led uprising." 
Once again, Kolko provides no direct evidence that this 
particular event motivated American policy.  The over- 
whelming weight of evidence suggests nearly the opposite 
conclusion.  Despite Churchill's strenuous urgings that the 
United States advance to Prague to prevent Soviet dominance 
in Czechoslovakia, and despite State Department support for 
this position, Eisenhower and George Marshall specifically 
rejected the intermingling of political and military con- 
siderations.  Truman furthermore, specifically chose not to 
revise strategy in light of Churchill's importunities.  Be- 
fore Roosevelt's death in April of 1945, Eisenhower had 
announced his intention to halt his troops at the Elbe and 
not undertake the capture of Berlin.  The reasons for this 
were a desire to avoid inadvertent clashes with Soviet 
troops and a fear that a thrust to Berlin "might have ex- 
posed Eisenhower's flanks to attacks from the German army." 
Further Churchill requests that the United States not with- 
draw its forces, already deep within the Russian occupation 
zone, were met with a note from Truman, saying, "I am un- 
able to delay the withdrawal of American troops from the 
Soviet zone in order to use pressure in the settlement of 
1 f) 7 
other problems."    Clearly, the political advantages of 
advancing to Prague were considered and rejected.  Kolko*s 
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analysis of American policy is speculative at best. 
Furthermore, Kolko shows a bothersome willingness to accept 
"strictly military" explanations for Soviet behavior, while 
rejecting similar explanations for American actions—with 
no reason given for the distinction.  While the American 
decision not to advance to Prague leads Kolko to say, "Ca]t 
the very least [emphasis addedj one may conclude that there 
was probably no desire to aid what the Americans understood 
16fl to be a Communist led uprising,"    Soviet failure to aid 
the Warsaw uprising in August of 1944 was a purely military 
decision, with "consideration of the political aspects ... 
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an afterthought."    Kolko does not mention the radio ap- 
peals from Moscow that urged an uprising in Warsaw in sup- 
170 port of the advancing Red Army,   or the Soviet refusal to 
permit the West to drop supplies to the struggling 
171 Poles.  i
Kolko does not suggest that the specific instances of 
American use of military power for political ends were 
critically important taken alone, but he cites them as evi- 
dence of a broader American intent to impose its will on 
Europe and limit Soviet influence by curtailing the "Left" 
and controlling Germany.  Whatever the American intent, the 
evidence Kolko cites does not substantiate his broad 
thesis.  The best example of Kolko's assignment of politi- 
cal motivation to military actions is his assertion that 
American orders to surrendering German troops in Italy to 
hand over weapons to only those forces designated by General 
63 
Alexander was designed to prevent transfer of power to the 
Italian Resistance:  "If the Anglo-American forces could 
not stop a possible Communist takeover, they would rely on 
the Germans to fend off the Resistance as best they 
172 could."    It would seem more logical to suggest that 
American policy sought to ensure an orderly transfer of 
authority and minimize possible threats to the physical 
173 
security of occupying American troops.    Kolko offers no 
evidence to suggest that the United States hoped German 
troops would attempt to prevent the Resistance from seizing 
power. 
One of the critical events that marred relations among 
the Allies as World War II drew to a close was the bitter 
exchange of letters between Stalin and Roosevelt over the 
Anglo-American negotiations with German representatives 
leading toward a possible surrender of German troops in 
Italy.  Although the Soviets were informed of the discus- 
sions and sent a representative to be present in the event 
of an actual surrender, the discussions excited Stalin*s 
fears that the Germans would conclude a separate peace in 
the West.  Stalin's letter to Roosevelt of April 3, 1945, 
charged that the Anglo-Americans had concluded a surrender 
of German forces in Italy in exchange for an agreement to 
go easy on Germany.  Stalin specifically said, "Some of my 
advisers find it difficult to explain the rapidity of the 
advance of the Anglo-American armies in Germany unless there 
174 is some underlying agreement with the Nazis."    According 
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to Bohlen, who helped draft Roosevelt's reply, Roosevelt 
"emphatically" denied Stalin's insinuations.  Stalin's sub- 
sequent reply averred that his advisers "must have been mis- 
informed" and expressed reassurance at Roosevelt's mes- 
175 sage. 
Revisionist scholars virtually turn this version of 
events on its head, suggesting that Stalin's fears may have 
had some basis and that the Berne negotiations, as they 
were called, were aimed at the "containment of the Italian 
1 76 Left."    Kolko suggests that Roosevelt's denial was made 
with "less than convincing candor," and that all parties to 
the incident "understood" that separate German surrenders 
in a major theater of war would permit Western forces to 
177 fill the political vacuum created by a German collapse. 
Beyond a reinterpretation of Roosevelt's letter to Stalin, 
which Bohlen reports was written by a singularly outraged 
1 78 President,    and Stalin's accusation, Kolko offers no 
evidence that the speed of the Anglo-American advance was 
in any way related to a secret agreement.  The relation of 
the Berne negotiations to a desire to contain the Italian 
Left is not demonstrated.  Adam Ulam points out that the 
Italian government to whom control of regions surrendered 
by the Germans would pass, was supported by the Italian 
Communists—in addition to being recognized by all three 
179 Allies.    Moreover, the invitation of Russian observers 
to future meetings with Germans, rather than reflecting a 
desire to exclude Soviet participation and weakening an 
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already shaky alliance, went beyond normal practice in re- 
gional surrenders.  Ulam points out that no Western repre- 
180 
sentative attended the German surrender in Stalingrad. 
Instead of reflecting a Western willingness to consider 
"every political advantage" to be gained from "alternative 
181 
military strategies,"   the Berne incident suggests that 
Britain and the United States were willing to accommodate 
Stalin*s sensibilities on some occasions.  More importantly, 
the incident illustrates the nature and extent of Soviet 
fears. 
Kolko manages to find a deeply political motivation in 
the American handling of the final German surrender: 
Given the entirely political [emphasis addedj 
basis of Anglo-American military strategy at 
the time, and the general relations with the 
U.S.S.R., such hard facts as exist point un- 
mistakably to a tawdry effort by the United 
States arid England to wring something out of 
the surrender for themselves.182 
On May 6, 1945, German efforts to arrange a separate sur- 
render of German forces in the West so that forces in the 
East could fight a holding action against the Russians—per- 
mitting evacuation of soldiers and civilians to within Anglo- 
American lines—prompted Eisenhower to threaten to break off 
surrender negotiations altogether and seal the Western Front 
to westward movement unless his terms of surrender were ac- 
cepted.  The German response to this ultimatum, while ac- 
cepting terms of full surrender, specified that fighting 
cease 48 hours after the signing of a surrender document. 
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Since this arrangement allowed the Germans to decide when 
to sign—facilitating a strategy of delay while troops 
evacuated to the West—Eisenhower insisted on a halt to 
fighting "on both fronts in 48 hours from midnight" May 6 
183 
or he would seal the front against any westward movement. 
This is essentially the version of events found in Truman's 
memoirs.  Although much of the factual information is the 
same, Kolko's version makes it look as though the United 
States acquiesced in a German strategy of fighting Russians 
while surrendering to the Western armies: 
When Eisenhower wired Truman about the situa- 
tion on May 6, he also informed hint that the 
purpose of the German 48-hour strategy 'is to 
continue to make a front against the Russians 
as long as they possibly can in order to 
evacuate maximum numbers of Germans into our 
lines.• 
From this Kolko concludes:  "The West it appeared could only 
184 gain."    A fuller version of Eisenhower's wire includes 
nothing that would even remotely substantiate Kolko's con- 
clusion that "The West it appeared could only gain." 
Eisenhower mentioned nothing about possible military or 
185 political advantages in the situation.    Kolko himself 
does not explain what it was that was apparently to be 
gained in the situation.  Moreover, Eisenhower said nothing 
about a 48-hour German strategy.  He noted that the overall 
German purpose was to make a front in the East while evacua- 
ting to the West.186 Kolko's critical distortion is his 
portrayal of the 48-hour period as part of a German strategy 
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of delay—with the result that American agreement to such a 
period appears to be acquiescence in a German scheme that 
might hold political advantages for the United States.  In 
Eisenhower's wires to Truman, the 48-hour period was seen 
as the conventional period of grace in which word of sur- 
render was conveyed to outlying units.  The German strategy 
was seen in the attempt to retain the choice of when to sign 
the surrender document—presumably after many Germans had 
187 
managed to escape to the West.     If anything, Eisenhower 
seems to have manipulated the German fear that the United 
States would permit no westward movement of any German 
refugees, to hasten an unconditional surrender on all 
fronts.  Eisenhower's original ultimatum to the Germans in- 
cluded no period of grace.  He simply said that unless his 
surrender terms were accepted he would close the Western 
Front.  When the Germans attempted to manipulate the timing 
of the signing of the surrender—which in any case would 
have included some period of grace—Eisenhower forestalled 
delay by insisting that all fighting had to have ceased 
within 48 hours of midnight May 6, or he would carry out his 
4-u   4. 188 threat. 
American actions in the closing days of World War II, 
if represented,with any accuracy, do not substantiate the 
revisionist understanding of American objectives in the 
postwar world.  The decision to retreat from the Elbe to 
previously agreed upon zones of occupation was made with the 
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realization that the United States was foregoing a possible 
bargaining lever—inasmuch as Churchill had urged linkage 
of Allied withdrawals to Soviet actions and Truman had re- 
189 jected that approach.    The evidence does not indicate 
that the United States used its wartime military strength 
in any consistently political fashion—let alone to assure 
accedd to East European markets or "contain the Left." Per- 
haps the best example of the American subordination of poli- 
tical considerations was the fact that in Yugoslavia mili- 
tary considerations "gradually led to almost total United 
States military support for the Partisan guerilla forces of 
190 Marshal Tito."    By misreading his sources Kolko manages 
191 to deny even this however. 
While Kolko emphasizes the political uses to which 
American conventional military strength was put, particu- 
larly in the closing stages of World War II, Williams and 
Gardner stress the role an American policy of "atomic 
diplomacy" played in aggravating Soviet-American relations. 
Although neither accepts Gar Alperovitz's thesis that 
President Truman initiated an abrupt turnaround in Roose- 
192 
velt's policy of cooperation with the Soviet Union  —if 
only because their demonology assigns greater consistency 
and calculation to American policy than does Alperovitz's— 
Gardner and Williams both cite Alperovitz as a source and 
echo much of his argument about the actual uses and effects 
of the American atomic monopoly. 
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Alperovitz argues that the prospect of possession of 
atomic power reinforced Truman's resolve to "get tough" 
with the Soviet Union and led him to postpone the Potsdam 
conference as long as possible in hopes of having a bomb 
that could be used to influence the Russians.  Truman's 
resolve was heightened by the failure of his policy of 
193 
economic coercion.    Alperovitz*s central thesis is that 
atomic bombs were used against Japan to "make Russia more 
194 
manageable in Europe."    The more general effect of pos- 
session of atomic power, as Alperovitz sees it, was that it 
emboldened American policy-makers in their pursuit of for- 
eign policy goals, one of which was to force Soviet with- 
drawal from Eastern Europe: 
Truman ... believed that the United States 
had sufficient power to force Soviet accep- 
tance of the American plan for lasting world 
peace.  Above all, his policy required a 
stable Europe based upon democratic govern- 
ments and a sound Continental economy ... 
the bomb seemed likely to force Soviet agree- 
ment to American economic and political plans 
for Eastern Europe.*95 
Alperovitz notes further, 
Byrnes has been quite explicit; his policy 
always aimed at forcing the Russians to 
yield in Eastern Europe, and in mid-1947 
he still continued to argue that the United 
States had it in its power to force the 
Russians to 'retire in a very decent manner.'^" 
Although Alperovitz's case is exhaustively argued, his 
book is fraught with errors of scholarship, including abuse 
of ellipsis, removal of quotations from context, stringing 
together of previously unrelated quotations, and misrender- 
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197 ing of temporal sequences.    The magnitude and frequency 
of these errors is sufficient to bring his conclusions into 
question.  In the quotation cited above, Alperovitz makes 
it appear that Secretary of State Byrnes hoped to force the 
Russians to retire from Eastern Europe in nothing less than 
a "very decent manner,"  In fact, when placed in context, 
Byrnes's remarks do not even refer to Eastern Europe.  The 
quotation, "to retire in a very decent manner," belonged to 
Karl Marx, whom Byrnes cited to illustrate that Russian 
goals had changed little since 1853.  Byrnes1s argument was 
that if other powers held firm, the Soviet Union would not 
"violate the integrity of Iran, Turkey, Greece, Italy, or 
198 
any other country."    Another example of Alperovitz*s 
scholarship is his rendering of yet another quotation from 
Byrnes:  "Byrnes's new advice to Truman was quite straight- 
forward:  'The bomb might well put us in a position to 
dictate our own terms. . • .'" This he sets in the context 
199 
of discussions about how to deal with the Soviet Union. 
In the passage Alperovitz cites for this statement Byrnes's 
concern is clearly with the possibility that the bomb would 
shorten the war with Japan.  In their original context the 
Byrnes remarks about "dictating terms" reflect his concern. 
Nothing suggests that Byrnes felt the bomb made possible the 
dictation of terms to the Soviet Union. 
Lloyd Gardner in his discussion of the effect of the 
atomic bomb on American policy resurrects the Byrnes 
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quotation about dictation of terms, once again placing it 
in the context of dictating terms to Russia rather than 
201 Japan.    The gist of Gardner's treatment of the atomic 
theme is that the United States, more than simply hoping 
202 to "make the Russians more manageable in Europe,"   looked 
upon atomic power as a lever with which to "back the full 
range of peaceful pressures ... to create the world they 
203 
wanted."    Suggesting that "to argue ... that Americans 
never made political atomic threats ... is to miss the 
point," Gardner notes that Truman's language in his August 
1945 "rain of ruin" announcement about the bombing of 
Hiroshima "must have caused them [the Russians] to base 
their policy in part upon what they thought America be- 
204 lieved about its new weapon." 
Williams talks of a new "vision of omnipotence" that 
informed American foreign policy after the successful test 
of an atomic device.  He writes: 
Particularly after the atom bomb was created 
and used, the attitude of the United States 
left the Soviets with but one real option: 
either acquiesce in American proposals or be 
confronted with American power and hostility.205 
Although he does not accept the Alperovitz argument that 
Truman initiated an abrupt change in American policy— 
noting that "the success of the bomb strengthened an ex- 
206 isting attitude and a traditional strategy,"   Williams 
asserts that "The United States dropped the bomb to end the 
war against Japan and thereby stop the Russians in Asia, 
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and  to give them sober pause in Eastern Europe." 
[author's emphasis]     Thus at Potsdam, possession of the 
bomb convinced the United States that it could "bargain 
from a position of formidable strength" in pursuit of its 
208 broad objective of the "Open Door." 
There are significant flaws in the "atomic diplomacy" 
argument found in revisionist accounts.  Adam Ulam openly 
scoffs at the Alperovitz thesis, saying, "it cannot with- 
stand the test of simple logic, not to mention the facts." 
He notes that whatever the intention, the dropping of the 
bomb did not prevent Soviet entry into the war with Japan. 
Furthermore, Soviet help was repaid with "substantial 
Chinese concessions" consistent with the Yalta agreement. 
Ulam suggests that, "even at Potsdam after [author's 
emphasis] the new weapon had been fully tested, it was a 
firm decision ... that Soviet help would still be needed, 
209 
and that the price for it should be paid in full." 
More importantly, Ulam observes that even Soviet sour- 
ces "do not accuse the United States of threatening the 
210 Soviet Union in 1945."    This serves to point out one of 
the central flaws in the atomic diplomacy theme:  that the 
United States never made overt threats with the bomb.  Of 
course the existence of a policy of atomic diplomacy should 
not be judged solely on the point of whether overt threats 
were made.  If American policy at Potsdam and after had 
taken a dramatic turn or had become tangibly firmer toward 
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the Soviet Union, it would be possible to argue that Ameri- 
can policy-makers were emboldened by the atom bomb.  This 
is not the case however.  In the normal give-and-take of 
the conference, there was little to suggest dramatic de- 
partures in policy.  Ulam notes that the agreement on the 
Polish western frontier followed Soviet wishes in sub- 
stance.  More importantly, Ulam observes that Soviet ac- 
counts of the conference were favorable.  He quotes from 
V.L. Israelian, who says, 
One must admit that on the whole the decisions 
of the conference represented a victory for 
democratic principles of postwar reconstruc- 
tion of the world.  Decisions on Poland, 
Germany ... peace negotiations placed solid 
foundations for a durable and lengthy peace. 
Israelian also notes that on the whole Harry Truman managed 
211 to repulse the intrigues of the British.    Lisle Rose re- 
counts that at Potsdam Byrnes made "repeated assurances of 
the American desire to see governments in the area (Eastern 
Europe) friendly to Russia." Moreover, Rose notes that 
years later Marshal Zhukov of the Soviet Union said of the 
Potsdam conference, 
Despite inevitable disputes and differ- 
ences, the Potsdam Conference on the whole 
showed a universal desire to lay the founda- 
tions for cooperation between the great 
powers on whose policies so much depended.212 
Although they are not conclusive, the Soviet sources cited 
suggest that the Russians were on the whole satisfied with 
the conference—nothing is mentioned about a hard American 
line or an abrupt change. 
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Thomas Hammond asserts that after the Potsdam meeting 
the United States did nothing to even suggest a diplomatic 
offensive aimed at forcing Soviet withdrawal from Europe. 
In the case of Bulgaria, for example, Alperovitz portrays 
Secretary of State Byrnes as undertaking a new initiative 
in which he demanded that the Bulgarian government be 
213 
"radically reorganized."    Hammond points out that the 
United States made no such request.  Byrnes merely restated 
the fact that the United States would not recognize Bulgaria 
until free elections had been held—a longstanding declara- 
214 tion.    More revealing of the nature of American inten- 
tions was the reprimand given the American representative 
in Bulgaria, Maynard Barnes, by Byrnes after Barnes had 
sought postponement of the Bulgarian election without prior 
approval of the State Department.  Barnes's representation 
to Moscow brought not only Soviet agreement to a postpone- 
ment, but a telegram from Washington saying, "Dept has con- 
sistently felt the formation of a representative democratic 
Government in Bulgaria is matter for Bulgarians to under- 
215 take."    Barnes's insubordination produced results, but 
can hardly be characterized as part of a policy of atomic 
diplomacy.  In Rumania, the government crisis brought on by 
King Michael's request that pro-Soviet Petru Groza resign, 
elicited this message from Byrnes to the American repre- 
sentative in Rumania: 
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Principal concern of US Govt at present 
juncture is, as you know, to keep the road 
open to a solution of Rumanian political 
crisis which will be acceptable to all 
three Allied Govts.  We hope no action will 
be taken which might seem to give ground for 
Soviet suspicion that crisis was brought 
about by "Anglo-American intervention."  Con- 
tact with Rumanian political leaders should 
be avoided at present stage. 
In this connection we do not think that 
any advice or assurances should be given the 
King regarding his present difficult position 
vis-a-vis Groza and Soviet officials or re- 
garding contingencies which may arise with 
respect to his political future or personal 
position ... though you may apprise him of 
this Govt*s hope that measures which might 
further provoke Soviet officials will be 
avoided.216 
Although the above quotation demonstrates American concern 
with Rumanian affairs, it hardly smacks of a desire to force 
Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Europe or atomic intoxica- 
tion. 
Hammond suggests that possession of the bomb did en- 
courage Truman to resist Soviet demands seen as "extrava- 
gant" and "wholly outside the sphere of normal Russian in- 
terest," but did not provoke an American effort to force 
Soviet retirement from Eastern Europe.  He observes that 
there is nothing to suggest the United States pursued such 
a goal—"even with the atom bomb."  Furthermore, while the 
possibility of using the bomb as a bargaining chip was dis- 
217 
cussed in Washington, discussion never led to policy. 
Thus it seems that the United States never actually 
used the atom bomb as a direct threat or a bargaining chip. 
Moreover, American policy-makers were not sufficiently in- 
toxicated with it to attempt to drive the Soviet Union out 
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of Eastern Europe as revisionist writers assert.  The bomb 
did, however, constitute an implied threat to the Soviet 
Union.  Charles Maier argues that, "the simple fact of one- 
sided possession of the bomb was bound to evoke mis- 
218 trust."    At best however, it would be difficult to sug- 
gest that American possession of the atom bomb did more than 
exacerbate prior Soviet mistrust, given previously men- 
tioned examples of mistrust such as Stalin's crude question- 
ing of American motivation with Harriman in 1941 and his 
accusatory note to Roosevelt concerning the Berne surrender 
negotiations.  Thomas Hammond points out that while the 
atomic bomb constituted an implied threat as long as the 
United States held it exclusively, the Red Army also con- 
stituted an implied threat—especially after the withdrawal 
219 
of American forces from Western Europe. 
The American handling (or mishandling) of proposals 
for international control of atomic energy cannot fairly be 
portrayed as of a piece with a coercive policy of atomic 
220 diplomacy as Gardner does.    Suggesting that Americans 
"behaved more like Zeus than Archimedes, jealously boasting 
of their ability to bring a 'rain of ruin from the air,"1 
Gardner imputes broader meaning to a specific threat dir- 
ected at a country with whom the United States was at 
221 
war.    There is nothing to suggest that the United States 
"jealously" boasted of its atomic abilities in any context 
other than the specific threat directed at Japan.  Gardner's 
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juxtaposition of Truman's "rain of ruin" statement with a 
critique of the American handling of atomic energy proposals 
in the United Nations obscures a critical difference be- 
tween failure to share atomic secrets—at worst a sin of 
omission—and the use of the threat of violence as a means 
to an end.  Aggressive policies of "atomic diplomacy" are 
not of a piece with mishandled proposals for international 
control. 
In any case, failure to involve the Soviets in workable 
plans for atomic energy control should be seen as a missed 
opportunity to assuage longstanding Soviet suspicions—if 
indeed it were possible to do so—rather than an aggressive, 
threatening exercise of power. 
Like so many of the examples of economic and military 
diplomacy cited by revisionist scholars, "atomic diplomacy" 
succumbs to contradictory evidence. 
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CHAPTER 5:  CONCLUSIONS 
The preceding discussion suggests that the United 
States did not in fact pursue a foreign policy in which its 
economic and military capabilities were ostentatiously 
brandished to secure certain clearly defined goals.  The 
examples of such a policy most frequently cited in re- 
visionist accounts turn out on closer examination to be 
either (1) not in fact cases of economic or military 
diplomacy, or (2) exaggerations of actual cases where con- 
sistency of motivation and intent are clearly distorted. 
The "atomic diplomacy" argument found in many revisionist 
accounts postulates a substantial hardening of the American 
diplomatic stance which did not in fact take place, and an 
objective (Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Europe) whose 
existence is demonstrated by incomplete quotations taken 
out of context. Much the same pattern of scholarship occurs 
in the cases of the Lend-Lease cancellation and the handling 
of the German surrender. 
The actual examples cited to demonstrate a coherent 
American policy of economic and military coercion do not 
support the conclusion of (1) an "Open Door" economic 
motivation to American foreign policy, or (2) consistent 
obduracy or aggressiveness, whatever the motivation. More- 
over, such actions as Eisenhower's withdrawal from the Elbe 
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despite the knowledge of the bargaining potential involved 
in continued occupation of lands within the Soviet zone, 
the acceptance of the substance of Soviet territorial de- 
mands in Poland, the assignment of unique status to Lend- 
Lease aid to the Soviet Union, and the precipitate demo- 
bilization of American troops after the war was conclu- 
222 ded,   do not bespeak an attitude of intoxication with the 
bargaining potential of military and economic might or an 
attitude of hostility to the Soviet Union.  Only in 1947 
with the articulation of the Truman Doctrine and the pro- 
mulgation of the Marshall Plan did the United States actual- 
ly formulate what might be called policies of economic and 
military diplomacy.  These were not part of a broader pat- 
tern.  Both programs were seen as responses to specific 
conditions, the Marshall Plan to the economic devastation 
in Europe, and the Truman Doctrine to the perceived overt 
223 Soviet probings in Greece, Iran, and Turkey. 
One of the problems with revisionist accounts is that 
they consistently misstate American foreign policy goals. 
Emphasizing general statements about the importance of in- 
ternational trade to the American economy made by various 
prominent Americans with varying degreesxof involvement in 
the formulation of foreign policy, revisionist scholars con- 
clude that the engine of American foreign policy was the 
need to insure an open world in which "American business 
224 
could trade, operate, and profit without restrictions." 
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The pattern in revisionist accounts seems to be to simply 
state that this was the overriding goal of policy in in- 
troductory remarks, and then simply impute it to various 
specific actions.  Gardner provides an excellent example 
of this technique.  In setting the stage for the Potsdam 
conference, Gardner cited statements by Alf Landon, Herbert 
Hoover, Eugene Rostow, and John M. Hancock on the impor- 
tance of private property, free trade, and the dangers of 
state trading.  He then quoted a worried article in Business 
Week lamenting the closing of Eastern Europe to Western 
European exports and concluded:  "The issue was in Truman's 
225 hands at Potsdam."    Whatever Landon, Rostow, et al, may 
have felt, neither they nor Business Week made American 
foreign policy in 1945, nor did they speak for the govern- 
ment.  Truman *s version of his objectives at Potsdam was 
that he wanted "to get the Russians into the war against 
Japan as soon as possible," and more importantly he wished 
to "come out with a working relationship to prevent another 
world catastrophe." Gardner simply imputes the concerns of 
a number of private citizens and a financial publication to 
227 Truman.  His stated objectives were not theirs. 
In their almost palpable eagerness to demonstrate the 
economic roots of American foreign policy, revisionist 
scholars occasionally read incorrect meaning into statements 
about economic matters by American officials.  Williams, for 
example, takes a statement by Will Clayton and fundamentally 
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distorts its meaning.  Clayton's statement said: 
The capitalistic system, whether internally 
or internationally ... can only work by 
the continual creation of disequilibrium in 
the comparative costs of production, 
Williams suggests that implicitly Clayton was saying:  "The 
profitability of America's corporate system depended upon 
228 
overseas economic expansion,"    Clayton's statement, an 
exposition of a specific economic principle, clearly said 
no such thing.  If the statement was meant to imply depen- 
dence on overseas expansion, it would not have included the 
phrase "whether internally or internationally."  On its very 
face the statement contradicts Williams's explanation of its 
meaning. 
Not only do revisionist scholars misstate American ob- 
jectives by emphasizing general statements about free trade 
made by American leaders, misreading others, and imputing 
economic motivation where no direct evidence of it exists, 
they largely ignore other stated objectives.  One of the 
most frequently articulated objectives of American policy 
toward Eastern Europe was the holding of free elections.  A 
list of general principles compiled in the fall of 1945 as 
a guide for American policy toward Eastern Europe had as its 
first principle to be pursued, 
The right of peoples to choose and maintain 
for themselves without outside interference 
the type of political, social, and economic 
systems they desire, so long as they con- 
duct their affairs in such a way as not to 
menace the peace and security of others.229 
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Lynn Davis notes that at Yalta, Roosevelt "proclaimed the 
primary goal of American policy in Eastern Europe to be the 
establishment of representative governments through the 
230 holding of free elections."    Kolko, Williams, and Gardner 
largely ignore the self-determination/free election goal of 
American policy and the diplomacy aimed at fulfilling it. 
The revisionist contention that American objectives in 
231 the world "precluded the Left from power"   or dictated 
232 efforts to "pry the Russians out of Eastern Europe"   is 
not reflected in State Department briefing papers recom- 
mending policy toward Eastern Europe.  For example, a Janu- 
ary 1945 paper on "Liberated Countries" said, 
Judging from recent indications the general 
mood of the people of Europe is to the left 
and strongly in favor of far-reaching economic 
and social reforms, but not, however, in favor 
of left-wing totalitarian regimes to achieve 
these reforms. ... These governments must be 
sufficiently to the left to satisfy the pre- 
vailing mood in Europe and to allay Soviet 
suspicions.233 
Similarly, a briefing paper for the Potsdam conference 
stated, 
While this government may not want to oppose 
a political configuration in Eastern Europe 
which gives the Soviet Union a predominant 
influence in Poland, neither would it desire 
to see Poland become in fact a Soviet satel- 
lite and have American influence there com- 
pletely eliminated. 
These are not conclusive statements of American goals of 
course, but they give a more accurate indication of the 
thinking of policy-makers in 1945 than isolated quotations 
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from American leaders—with qualifying or contradicing 
phrases lopped off—or the general statements of private 
citizens or publications. 
By misrepresenting the nature of American goals and 
needs and imputing a single, overriding, economic motiva- 
tion to American actions, several revisionist historians 
have done violence to the historical record. A need for 
economic access to Eastern Europe was never sufficiently 
strongly felt to require efforts to force Soviet with- 
drawal from that region. 
Although revisionist scholars assert that the policies 
of economic and military diplomacy growing out of perceived 
American economic needs provoked a defensive Soviet reaction, 
particularly after 1947, their accounts are conspicuously 
lacking in direct evidence of the impact of the specific 
American policies they discuss upon the Soviet Union.  The 
discussion of the consequences of the failure to come to 
terms on a postwar loan is a good example of this.  The 
negative impact (or its relative significance) is inferred 
without reference to any particular Soviet response.  An- 
other example of this approach is Gardner's suggestion that 
Truman's supposedly boastful "rain of ruin" language "must 
have*1 caused the Russians "to base their policy in part 
upon what they thought America believed about its new 
235 
weapon."    Revisionist scholars rarely demonstrate the 
linkage between American policy and Soviet actions. 
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It is not entirely fair to dismiss revisionist argu- 
ments for failure to demonstrate specific Soviet reactions 
to American actions, given the paucity of Soviet sources 
and the inaccessibility of Soviet archives.  Students of 
Soviet foreign policy often seem to be reduced to drawing 
inferences from limited information and the broader flow 
of events.  If one could demonstrate a consistent pattern 
of expansive American behavior characterized by the use of 
blunt economic pressures and atomically induced inflexi- 
bility, and a pattern of essentially moderate Soviet be- 
havior, it would be quite plausible (in the absence of 
better evidence) to infer that a consolidation of the Soviet 
grip in Eastern Europe was a response to American actions. 
In a broader sense, the post-World War II descent into Cold 
War could be blamed to a greater extent on the United 
States if Soviet policy is defined as defensive and moderate 
and American policy as expansive and inflexible.  This is 
the essence of the revisionist argument and its overriding 
flaw.  The argument rests on a definition of American 
policy already shown to be inaccurate in a number of re- 
spects, and a definition of Soviet policy as pluralistic, 
moderate, and defensive—at least before 1947.  Where re- 
visionist scholars fail in their discussion of Soviet policy 
is in glossing over or simply neglecting any number of 
Soviet actions that disturbed American policy-makers, or 
more importantly, demonstrate significant qualities of 
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ruthlessness and intolerance on the part of Soviet foreign 
policy-makers—quite apart from American actions.  More- 
over, the evidence cited to demonstrate a pattern of Soviet 
circumspection is often less than convincing. 
Lloyd Gardner, for example, suggests that by avoiding 
involvement in Greece, Stalin adhered to his celebrated 
"percentages'* agreement with Churchill in which Russian and 
British predominance in the various countries of the Balkans 
236 
was determined in varying percentages.    Williams de- 
scribes Stalin's "self-containment" in Greece, noting 
Churchill's feeling that Stalin adhered to their agree- 
237 
ment.    Whatever Churchill may have felt, the agreement 
was never applied to concrete reality.  Adam Ulam points 
out that Britain never received its requisite 50 percent 
share of Hungarian affairs and speculates that Stalin's 
failure to aid Greek communists had more to do with the 
fact that the Red Army simply did not occupy Greece than 
with an abstract and unworkable agreement.  The Soviet Union 
did not accord Britain so much as one percent influence or 
predominance in the various countries mentioned in the 
238 Churchill-Stalin agreement. 
Soviet attempts to neutralize any Western participation 
in the control commissions managing Allied (i.e., Soviet 
occupation in Eastern Europe are portrayed as essentially 
moderate by the citation of Western precedent.  Unilateral 
Soviet behavior is seen as the mirror image of the Anglo- 
American handling of the Italian surrender and occupation, 
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239 in which Soviet representatives played a minimal role. 
Kolko asserts that the Soviet Union applied "precisely" the 
Italian pattern in the occupation of Rumania, Bulgaria, and 
Hungary, and that the United States was particularly ex- 
240 
ercised at the precise application of the pattern.    This 
is simply not so.  In Bulgaria, for example, the United 
States accepted Soviet domination of the Allied Control 
Commission and expressed the hope that the United States 
be permitted to participate "in a manner similar to that of 
241 the Soviet representative in Italy."    Similarly, American 
proposals to the Soviet government regarding participation 
in control commissions in Eastern Europe "sought a degree 
of participation ... equal to that given the Soviet repre- 
242 
sentative in Italy."    The Soviet Union clearly did not 
apply the Italian pattern.  Moreover, the Soviet Union 
obstructed the sending of American representatives to 
Prague in April of 1945—and Czechoslovakia was technically 
243 
a liberated ally with an independent government.    Simi- 
larly, Western observers were not allowed into Poland in 
244 the spring of 1945.    Such actions cannot be construed 
as reflections of Western actions. 
A central point in the revisionist argument is that 
Soviet policy in Eastern Europe after World War II was 
pluralistic and nonideological—and therefore essentially 
moderate.  Kolko and Williams particularly point to the ex- 
istence of "popular front" governments as evidence for this 
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assertion.    The definition of Soviet policy in Eastern 
Europe (particularly before 1947) as moderate and defensive 
is critical to the conclusion that American actions pro- 
voked the less tolerant, ideological Soviet policies ulti- 
mately manifested in the ruthless consolidation of 1947-48. 
This definition is open to question. 
In the first place revisionist scholars ignore or 
gloss over Soviet actions of 1945 and earlier that were 
seen as part of an effort to establish total communist con- 
trol by strong-arm methods.  In January of 1945, for ex- 
ample, "American officials ... became concerned over 
Soviet efforts to establish total political control in 
Bulgaria."  Reports from the American representative to the 
Secretary of State noted that, 
Communists were gradually seizing power 
through the activities of the Communist- 
controlled Ministry of the Interior, the 
Bulgarian police, and the Soviet army ... 
The severity of the penalties administered 
by the People's Courts in the war crimes 
trials confirmed Communist determination 
to eliminate all potential opposition.246 
Brzezinski writes that in September of 1944 when the Soviet 
Union declared war on Bulgaria and the Fatherland Front 
seized power, the Communist Party played a major role in 
a purge of public officials which "amounted simply to a ter- 
ror operation, designed to destroy the political cadres of 
the 'bourgeoisie'."  He notes that within six months of the 
247 
entry of Soviet troops, 2,138 people were executed. 
88 
In May 1945, the American representative to the Allied 
Control Commission in Rumania, General Schuyler, reported 
that " Jjbj he present Rumanian government is a minority 
government imposed on the nation by direct Soviet pres- 
sure."248 
George Kennan recounts that in the spring of 1945, 
What little we were able to learn ... 
about what was occurring in that part of 
Czechoslovak territory occupied by Soviet 
forces made it evident that every device of 
infiltration, intimidation, and intrigue was 
being brought into play with a view to laying 
the groundwork for establishment of a Com- 
munist monopoly of power in that country. 
Kennan notes that this impression was confirmed when the 
Soviet Union obstructed the sending of American represen- 
249 tatives to the restored Czech government. 
In March of 1945, the British and Americans disagreed 
over "the best strategy to prevent the arrests, deporta- 
tions, and liquidations" occurring under the Warsaw-cum- 
Lubin government.  The upshot of these discussions was a 
simple American expression of the need for tranquility in 
D i  ,4 250 Poland. 
Although it did not produce a change in American 
policy, the Soviet handling of the Warsaw uprising in the 
summer of 1944 was disillusioning for American policy-makers. 
Dean Acheson mentions the chilling effect on Soviet- 
251 American relations of the Soviet behavior,    and Kennan re- 
calls that the Soviet position on the matter was seen as a 
"gauntlet thrown down" to state Russian intentions toward 
89 
Political consequences of the uprising (the slaughter of 
253 
the Polish underground) as an afterthought,   he does not 
account for Soviet obstruction of efforts to assist the 
doomed Poles, or the Soviet radio broadcasts urging an up- 
, .   254 
rising. 
The examples cited above do not substantiate the as- 
sertion that the Soviet Union was largely unconcerned with 
255 internal developments in Eastern Europe,    Nor do these 
examples suggest that the Soviet Union entertained feelings 
of pluralistic solicitude for potential opponents.  Given 
this evidence and additional confirmation of "constant and 
vigorous  Russian  intrusion" into Eastern European internal 
p c c 
affairs by the Ethridge report,    it is not altogether 
surprising that by the end of 1945 American officials were 
concluding that "to concede a limited Soviet sphere of in- 
fluence ... might be to invite its extension to other 
.,257 
areas." 
More importantly, the existence of popular front govern- 
ments in Eastern Europe in the immediate postwar period is 
not necessarily convincing evidence of a pluralistic, 
nonideological Soviet foreign policy.  Thomas Hammond sug- 
gests that popular front governments were important ele- 
ments in a takeover strategy.  Hammond notes that most of 
the Communist takeovers of the 1940,s were 
directed by Communists who had spent the 
war years in Russia, who returned to their 
native lands with takeover plans carefully 
worked out in advance, and who received 
90 
instructions regularly from Moscow and from 
Soviet officials on the scene. . . . During 
the war Communist cadres from Europe and Asia 
were trained in special schools in the Soviet 
Union to participate in the communization of 
their homelands. 
Hammond describes Soviet orders to Eastern European com- 
munists to employ conscious tactics of, "gradualism and 
camouflage instead of immediately establishing a one-party 
regime."  The essence of these policies is expressed in a 
remark of Walter Ulbricht's which Hammond cites:  "It's got 
to look democratic, but we must have everything in our con- 
trol."  Hammond concludes that Eastern European takeovers 
reflected a tactical blueprint: 
If by a blueprint one means a rigid plan 
which all Communist leaders were ordered 
to follow without a change, then of course 
there was no blueprint.  If, however, one 
means a general tactical plan which Stalin 
expected each Communist leader to adapt 
and modify to suit local conditions, then 
it seems clear that there was such a blue- 
print.258 
Also revealing of the nature of Soviet intentions in 
Europe and of Soviet policy in general is the fact that in 
1943 the Comintern was dissolved in name only.  While Stalin 
announced the dissolution with a good deal of fanfare, the 
Comintern apparatus remained intact to continue training 
people such as Wolfgang Leonhard for future political 
4. L.  259 tasks. 
None of this suggests either a pluralistic, nonideo- 
logical Soviet approach to Eastern European politics or the 
conclusion that American policies caused the demise of such 
91 
an approach.  Zbigniew Brzezinski argues that the popular 
front or "People's Democracy" period, in which communists 
and other progressive groups cooperated, represented a de- 
finite, ideologically defined intermediate stage in the 
260 
realization of communist goals.    Once again, there is 
little in this analysis to suggest that popular front 
governments were anything but transient phenomena. More- 
over, Brzezinski's analysis does not suggest a nonideologi- 
cal approach on the part of Soviet leaders. 
Khrushchev's discussion of Soviet policies toward 
Poland in the immediate postwar period is couched in terms 
of almost nonchalant inevitability, with little reference 
to outside political pressures: 
We knew that sooner or later Poland would 
be a socialist country and our ally.  Many 
of us felt, myself included, that someday 
Poland would be part of one great country 
or socialist commonwealth of nations.261 
Khrushchev accents this sense of "sooner or later" in- 
evitability to the direction of politics in postwar Poland 
by jovially passing along the anecdote about the Polish 
election, in which voters put a Mikolajczyk ballot in the 
box and get a Gomulka ballot out of it.  Despite this, 
Khrushchev suggests, the Poles decided to "build social- 
,   ,,262 ism." 
Khrushchev says little that would suggest consolida- 
tion in Poland was determined by Western pressures.  He 
does suggest that the first shot in the Cold War was fired 
by Churchill in his Fulton, Missouri speech of 1946.  He 
92 
notes that "It was largely [emphasis added] because of 
Churchill's speech that Stalin exaggerated our enemies' 
263 
strength and their intention to unleash war on us." 
This last statement suggests that previous Western 
actions were not perceived as particularly unsettling. 
The revisionist argument that the American attempt to 
use its preponderant economic and military strength to 
alter Soviet behavior, preserve economic access in Eastern 
Europe, and reconstruct the postwar world in a manner con- 
sistent with deeply held economic assumptions fails on a 
number of counts.  First of all, a consistent policy of 
military and economic diplomacy was never applied.  Second, 
the goals attributed to American foreign policy are in- 
correct.  Third, the direct, negative consequences of par- 
ticular American actions on Soviet-American relations are 
rarely demonstrated.  Fourth, in the absence of direct    "\ 
evidence of Soviet reactions to specific American actions, 
the revisionist argument rests on the questionable assump- 
tion that Soviet policy, particularly in Eastern Europe, 
was essentially moderate and nonideological. 
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